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A Generation of Racketeers?




This article addresses questions raised in recent years by the
increasingly severe penalties for copyright infringement, focusing on
potential civil RICO liability as illustrated by a hypothetical peer-to-
peer file-sharing example. Because civil litigation has been, by a wide
margin, the favored means for pursuing copyright violators, the
criminal copyright infringement statute remains largely untested, and
the few cases that address its provisions offer conflicting
interpretations. Now that RICO penalties are available in civil
copyright infringement cases, courts faced with resolving the
ambiguities in the application of the criminal copyright infringement
provisions will need to reconcile divergent policies. To effectuate its
remedial purpose, courts broadly interpret the RICO statute-even
beyond the scope intended by Congress-yet rely heavily on the
legislative history of the Copyright Act to balance the interest of
copyright owners in controlling their works with that of the public in
accessing them.
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Recent amendments that increase the penalties for copyright
infringement could reach much farther than Congress intended, by
imposing criminal and RICO liability-not only on commercial
"pirates" who make huge profits selling illegal copies-but also on
noncommercial actors who share files solely for private use. RICO
liability may even reach the entities that enable illegal file-sharing,
under traditional theories of secondary liability. In addition, the
relative ease with which plaintiffs may assert RICO claims poses a risk
that traditional copyright remedies will expand broadly in ways not
contemplated by Congress when it added criminal copyright
infringement as a RICO predicate act.
This article asserts that the drumbeat against "piracy" has
drowned out the many voices on the other side of the debate, creating
the possibility of devastating punishment for conduct that millions of
people believe reasonable. Congress enacted limited copyright
protection as a means of encouraging the creation of artistic works and
ensuring their access by the public. If the new penalty provisions are
too liberally interpreted and applied, this delicate balance may tip too
far in favor of copyright owners, extending their monopoly and chilling
legitimate uses of copyrighted works. Ultimately, Congress should
remove criminal copyright infringement from the list of RICO predicate
acts, or at least limit RICO liability to the most egregious commercial
infringers.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INDUSTRY EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF DIGITAL
COPYING............................................... 63
A. Copyright Owners' Concerns About Digital Copying
and Consumer Perceptions Regarding the "Right" to
Share Digital Content ........................ 63
B. The Industry Strikes Back ..................... 68
1. The "Customer is Wrong" Approach.. ............... 68
2. The Industry's Success in Altering Legal Norms to
Provide Severe Penalties for Infringement .... ...... 70
3. The Creation of RICO Liability for Copyright
Infringement .................................. 75
II. THE POTENTIAL EASE WITH WHICH COPYRIGHT DISPUTES
CAN BE CONVERTED INTO CIVIL RICO LAWSUITS ................. 77
A. Proof of Criminal Copyright Infringement . ........... 78
1. Requirement of Copyright Infringement ...... ..... 79
2. Requirement of Willful Infringement .............. 84
3. The For Profit or Sufficient Value Requirement......... 88
[Vol. 13:1:55
2010] RICO LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
B. Proving a RICO Claim in a Copyright Case.................. 91
1. Enterprise..................................... 94
2. Racketeering Activity ...................... 98
3. Pattern ....................................... 99
4. Proof of Liability under § 1962(c) or (d) ....... ..... 101
5. Standing under § 1964(c) ................. ...... 106
III. CONCERNS ABOUT IMPORTING RICO LIABILITY INTO THE
COPYRIGHT CONTEXT.................................... 107
A. Differences Between Copyright Infringement and Other
RICO Predicate Acts ............................... 111
B. Civil RICO's "Private Attorney General" Function Is
Unnecessary in the Copyright Context.... ........... 114
C. The Stigma of "Racketeer" and Its Effect on Settlement 117
D. Problems with Over-deterrence and Under-deterrence.. 121
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................... 125
A growing number of people-many of whom are tweens, teens,
and twenty-somethings-see nothing wrong with digital copyright
infringement, believing that laws banning such conduct are either
unfair or inapplicable to those who make only private use of the works
they download.' This generation of consumers downloads music and
movie files from the Internet without paying for them; burns copies of
music CDs and movie DVDs to share with others; and makes
previously-purchased entertainment files available for others to
download over the Internet through peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing
programs like Shareaza, Limewire, BitTorrent, and Ares. 2 To the
industries that profit from the sale of copyrighted works, this conduct
1. See, e.g., Bus. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, TWEENS' AND TEENS' INTERNET BEHAVIOR AND
ATTITUDES ABOUT COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS (2004) [hereinafter TWEENS AND TEENS], available
at http://www.bsa.org/country/Research%20and%2OStatistics/Research%20Papers.aspx (follow
hyperlink containing title) (summarizing results of 2004 survey of 1183 respondents, ages 8-18,
showing widespread belief that downloading copyrighted content without paying for it is not
wrong); Christopher Jensen, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright,
Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531, 539-44 (2003) (discussing
rationales given by those who choose to disobey copyright law); Kate Leadbetter, Rights Group
Defends P2P in Ad Campaign, ZDNET UK (July 1, 2003), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/
networking/2003/07/01/rights-group-defends-p2p-in-ad-campaign-2136872 (quoting statement by
Fred von Lohmann, senior staff attorney for Electronic Frontier Foundation, that 60 million U.S.
citizens use file-sharing software and arguing that Congress was ignoring citizens' interests in
file sharing because of record industry lobbying).
2. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-27 (2005)
(discussing the operation of Morpheus and Grokster peer-to-peer file-sharing software platforms
and finding Grokster liable for copyright infringement due to its inducement of direct
infringement by users of its P2P service).
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is "piracy," no different from walking into a store and stealing a CD or
DVD off the shelf.3
The music and film industries have engaged in a multi-faceted
effort to halt, or at least slow, the use of home computers and other
digital devices to make illegal copies of copyrighted works. Industry
groups like the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")
and Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") initially brought
high-profile lawsuits against corporate entities in attempts to prohibit
the sale of software or hardware that enables consumers to illegally
copy audio and audio-visual works. 4 They also launched largely
unsuccessful media campaigns to persuade a generation of Internet
users that illegal copying is wrong and harmful to the artists who
create music and films, 5 as well as a very successful lobbying effort in
Congress to increase civil and criminal penalties available under the
Copyright Act.6
3. Indeed, the RIAA has elaborated on the piracy metaphor, stating: "Old as the
Barbary Coast, New as the Internet-No black flags with skull and crossbones, no cutlasses,
cannons, or daggers identify today's pirates. You can't see them coming; there's no warning shot
across your bow. Yet rest assured the pirates are out there because today there is plenty of gold
(and platinum and diamonds) to be had. Today's pirates operate not on the high seas, but on the
Internet, in illegal CD factories, distribution centers, and on the street. The pirate's credo is still
the same-why pay for it when it's so easy to steal? The credo is as wrong as it ever was.
Stealing is still illegal, unethical, and all too frequent in today's digital age. That is why RIAA
continues to fight music piracy." Anti-Piracy, INTELL. SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2005),
http://www.intellectualsecurity.com/2005/11/antipiracy.php (citing the Recording Industry
Association of America).
4. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc., 545 U.S. at 936-37 (upholding secondary liability for
distributors of file-sharing software); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (rejecting secondary liability for the makers of the Betamax video recording device);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (imposing secondary liability
for the developer of software making it possible for computer users to engage in online peer-to-
peer file sharing); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to impose secondary liability on manufacturer of hand-held device
capable of receiving and storing digital audio files on computer hard drives).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. & The City of N.Y. Mayor's
Office of Film, Theatre, & Broad., Gotham Theaters and Taxicabs Now Playing Anti-Piracy
Trailers as Part of MPAA/New York City Campaign (Aug. 20, 2007), available at http://
www.mpaa.org/resources/91b64cOa-d4bf-4566-ba8-bcc53f46Oe6d.pdff Patrick Ross, Copyright
Alliance Exec. Dir., Presentation for the Federal Communications Commission (Sept. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.copyrightalliance.org/files/fcctestimony.pdf (advocating on behalf of a
variety of entertainment media for independent artists whose works are infringed online);
Copyright Information, MOTION PICTURE ASS'N OF AM., http://mpaa.org/content
protection/copyright-info (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (explaining the motion picture industry's
position on copyright protections for motion pictures and why it is wrong to make unlawful
copies of movies).
6. See, e.g., No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997)
(eliminating requirement that criminal copyright infringement be for purposes of financial gain
by including provision allowing criminal penalties if the retail value of the copied work or works
exceeds $1,000); Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3,
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In June of 2003, the recording industry announced its plans to
file lawsuits against individuals who participated in the illegal
sharing of copyrighted works over the Internet.7 Before ending its
litigation campaign in 2009,8 the RIAA filed thousands of lawsuits
against individual file sharers seeking civil copyright infringement
damages.9 After announcing an end to its litigation campaign against
individual infringers, the RIAA stated that it was shifting its
approach in light of arrangements worked out with Internet Service
110 Stat. 1386, 1386 (adding criminal copyright infringement as a predicate act for purposes of
criminal and civil RICO liability); Criminal Penalties for Copyright Infringement, Pub. L. No.
102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992) (expanding felony punishment to cover infringement of at least 10
copies of any copyrighted work with a retail value of more than $2500); Piracy and
Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 (introducing felony
penalties for criminal copyright infringement of sound recordings or audiovisual works).
7. The focus of this Article will be on the unauthorized copying of sound recordings,
largely because music files are much smaller than digital copies of films or software and are
more easily transferred over the Internet, and thus the recording industry has been at the
forefront of efforts to enforce copyright in the digital age. See generally Damon Lussier, Beyond
Napster: Online Music Distribution and the Future of Copyright, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
25, 26-33 (2001) (discussing online technologies that make the transfer of audio files over the
Internet quick and easy). The RIAA launched its campaign against individuals who download or
make available for download unauthorized copies of copyrighted musical recordings with
lawsuits against four college students filed in April of 2003. See Benny Evangelista, Four
Students Sued Over Music Trading Software, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2003, http://articles.
sfgate.com/2003-04-04/news/17485608 1_file-sharing-computer-network-riaa-president-cary-
sherman. The four students were alleged to have set up file-sharing networks on their colleges'
computer networks that offered tens of thousands of music files for sharing, and the lawsuits
sought statutory damages of $150,000 for each recording that was illegally offered for download
over the networks. Id. The cases were all settled in May of 2003, with each student agreeing to
pay up to $17,500 and promising not to violate the copyrights of the plaintiffs. See Jefferson
Graham, Students Paying for Playing, USA TODAY, May 5, 2003, http://www.usatoday.
com/tech/news/2003-05-04-students x.htm.
8. See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at Bi.
9. The RIAA obtained at least 871 federal subpoenas against computer users during
the three-week period in 2003 following the RIAA's announcement, "with roughly 75 new
subpoenas being approved each day." Music Industry Wins 871 Subpoenas Against Internet
Users, OZZU (July 19, 2003, 12:03 AM), http://www.ozzu.com/ftopic1123.html. A court ruling
stopped the RIAA from obtaining the identities of potential defendants from Internet Service
Providers, but the RIAA did not slow its filing of lawsuits. See Recording Indus. Ass'n. of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reversing and remanding on
the grounds that subpoenas may not be issued under § 512(h) of the Copyright Act to ISPs that
are engaged solely in transmitting infringing material on behalf of others); News Room,
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS'N OF AM., http://www.riaa.cominews room.php?news-year filter=2004
(last visited Oct. 4, 2010) (providing links to press releases that describe the filing of an average
of more than 500 new lawsuits each month during 2004). As a result of the D.C. Circuit's ruling,
the RIAA resorted to simply filing "John Doe" lawsuits and then using the subpoena power
available once litigation is pending to identify users by their screen names. See More Copyright
Infringement Lawsuits Brought Against Illegal File Sharers, RECORDING INDUSTRY AsS'N OF AM.
(May 24, 2004), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=4627CFE3-3AAC-93A6-D77A-AE4CO
4824580 (noting the RIAA's use of the "John Doe" litigation process to sue defendants before
their names are known); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a) (governing issuance of subpoenas for
discovery or trial in federal lawsuits).
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Providers ("ISPs") to provide email alerts to customers found using an
ISP's services to infringe, with the threat of cessation of Internet
services if the conduct continued.'0 However, the RIAA noted that it
still reserved the right to sue individuals it deemed "particularly
heavy file sharers.""
Although the RIAA has been battling the illegal copying of
musical works for years, its efforts to constrain online "sharing" of
music files prior to 2003 had focused on lawsuits against the creators
of the P2P networks that made such copying possible, 12 rather than
the individuals actually uploading and downloading copyrighted
works. The RIAA's suits against individual users ushered in a new
era for teens and twenty-somethings, who grew up in a time of
unlimited, unpunished sharing of copyrighted materials,1 3 but who
could now find themselves subjected to civil, and even criminal,
sanctions if they actively shared files.
If these file sharers are uploading and downloading
copyrighted works,14 their practices infringe the rights of the copyright
owners and could subject them to civil and criminal penalties.'5 To
the extent that these practices take place in an organized fashion
involving multiple people, such as through file-sharing software or
10. McBride & Smith, supra note 8; RIAA to Stop Mass Lawsuits, ROLLING STONE, Feb.
5, 2009, at 18.
11. McBride & Smith, supra note 8.
12. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F.
Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
13. See supra TWEENS AND TEENS, note 1; Downloading Music is Good. Cheating is Bad.
Why Teens Say Both, INST. FOR GLOBAL ETHICS (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.globalethics.org/
newsline/2003/09/29/downloading-music-is-good-cheating-is-bad-why-teens-say-both.
14. Many works are available over the Internet that may be freely copied and exchanged
under U.S. copyright law. For example, as copyright is a limited monopoly that expires after the
passage of time, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, any work that has entered the public domain can be
up- or down-loaded with impunity. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-208, 211-214
(2003) (discussing the balance between the limited copyright monopoly and the public domain).
In addition, some artists make their music or audiovisual works available to users over the
Internet with express licenses permitting free copying of the music for individual use and
enjoyment. See, e.g., A-Z Artists, SUBPOP RECORDS, http://www.subpop.com/artists/ (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010) (offering many of its artists' songs for free downloading); ATOM,
http://www.atom.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (offering dozens of short films for users to
download and view without charge); Michael D. Crawford, Links to Tens of Thousands of Legal
Music Downloads, GOINGWARE, INC., http://www.goingware.com/tips/legal-downloads.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2010) (providing links to Internet sites where music is available for downloading
without charge and with the permission of the copyright owners); What is CC?, CREATIVE
COMMONS, http://creativecommons.orglabout/what-is-cc (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (providing
access to numerous works that are in the public domain or licensed for individual use by their
owners for free downloading).
15. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 506 (2006).
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Internet sites, these file sharers could also be branded "racketeers"
and subject to liability under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 16 despite having no affiliation with
organized crime. These RICO sanctions arise under the Anti-
Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, which added
criminal copyright infringement as a predicate act for purposes of
imposing criminal and civil RICO liability on defendants and thus
enabled plaintiffs who can prove multiple acts of copyright
infringement to recover an award of treble damages.17
As the law now stands, a teenager who stores her music
collection in MP3 files on her computer or MP3 player and who
downloads several songs a day and one film a week could be subjected
to statutory copyright damages in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars, as well as the possible trebling of those damages if her conduct
occurred through an organized public or private file sharing system.18
Of additional concern is the potential for recovery of civil RICO
penalties against secondary copyright infringers-those who do not
directly infringe but who knowingly make infringement possible, such
as P2P service providers and even ISPs that have knowledge of and
control over users' ability to infringe. This Article argues that the
addition of potential RICO damages to the already wide range of
possible copyright damages is unnecessary to deter infringement and
places too much power in the hands of copyright owners, leading to
settlement of cases where liability is uncertain but potentially
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006) (including as an act of "racketeering activity" any act
indictable under 18 U.S.C. § 2319, which governs the punishment for violation of criminal
copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
17. Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386.
18. It is unlikely that such an award would ever be entered, both because of the lack of
resources on the part of the student to defend a copyright infringement suit and because of the
general public's view that file sharing is not a great evil, which would likely lead to a much
smaller damage award if the case ever reached a jury (the "sticky norm" problem). See Dan M.
Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
607 (2000) (discussing "sticky norm" phenomenon when the law condemns behavior that the
general public does not condemn). In one of the few articles discussing the addition of criminal
copyright infringement to the list of predicate acts for purposes of RICO liability, one author has
argued that the RIAA and MPAA should file civil RICO actions instead of copyright infringement
actions, joining both individual P2P file sharers and P2P services like Grokster and Kazaa and
seeking to impose joint and several liability against a large group of such defendants in one
action. Phillip Stuller, Note and Comment, How the RIAA Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love
the RICO Act: Exploiting Civil RICO to Battle Peer-to-Peer Copyright Infringement, 24 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 521 (2004). Had the RIAA and MPAA taken such an approach, they would likely
have been subject to even greater public criticism than that which followed the individual
lawsuits filed by the RIAA, see supra note 9, leading to an even greater "sticky norm" problem
than they currently face. However, even if juries are not likely to award the full scope of
available damages in cases involving infringement for private use, this Article addresses why the
threat of large statutory damage awards and treble damages is still a concern.
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devastating. The rights of copyright owners were never intended to be
absolute,19 and placing too much power in their hands through the
amount of damages they can allege in a civil suit tips the balance too
heavily in favor of the monopoly and gives too little weight to the
public interest.
Part I of this Article highlights the efforts made by copyright
owners over the past two decades to combat digital piracy. In
particular, it introduces some of the questions raised by the increased
penalties for copyright infringement in recent years, focusing on the
addition of potential civil RICO liability to the already severe
penalties for infringement.
Part II discusses how easy it could be to convert a civil
copyright infringement claim into a civil RICO claim, using the
hypothetical P2P user as an example. Because civil litigation has
been, by far, the more common avenue for pursuing copyright
violators, the criminal copyright infringement statute remains largely
untested and, to the extent that courts have addressed its provisions,
has led to conflicting interpretations. Moreover, now that RICO
penalties are available in civil copyright infringement cases, courts
faced with resolving the ambiguities of criminal copyright
infringement provisions will have to address the clash of interpretive
policies in the copyright and RICO contexts. While courts have
interpreted the language of the RICO statute broadly to apply to
defendants and conduct well outside its original purpose, largely
ignoring its legislative history, 20 courts have relied heavily on the
legislative history of the Copyright Act to interpret its language,
typically refusing to extend the scope of the Act beyond what the
legislative history supports. 21
Part III addresses concerns raised by these recent amendments
to the Copyright Act, which increase the available penalties for
copyright infringement, suggesting that they could reach much farther
than Congress intended, imposing criminal and civil RICO liability
not just on commercial "pirates" who make illegal copies and sell them
to others at huge profits but also on those who engage in file sharing
solely for private use-and perhaps even those who make it possible
for them to do so. The relative ease with which copyright owners may
assert RICO claims risks a broad expansion of traditional copyright
remedies not contemplated by Congress when it added criminal
copyright infringement as a predicate act under RICO. Copyright
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing the granting of limited copyright monopoly).
20. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491-93 (1985).
21. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 222 (1985).
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exists as a means of serving the public interest by encouraging both
the creation of artistic works and access to those works by the public. 22
If the new penalty provisions are too liberally interpreted and applied,
the delicate balance between rewarding creativity and allowing public
enjoyment of such creativity will tip too much in favor of copyright
owners, over-extending the monopoly rights of copyright holders and
chilling legitimate uses of copyrighted works.
Part IV concludes by arguing that the pendulum has swung too
far as a result of pressure from industry lobbying groups, without the
benefit of the many voices on the other side of the debate, creating the
possibility of devastating punishment for conduct that millions of
computer users believe is reasonable. It calls for restraint from courts
in interpreting and applying the criminal copyright infringement and
civil RICO statutes, from copyright owners in their demands for
punishment of infringers, and from Congress when considering
further amendments to the Copyright Act that would permit even
greater punishments for infringement. Finally, this Article proposes
that Congress amend the law by either removing criminal copyright
infringement as a basis for civil RICO liability or by making RICO
penalties available only against those defendants who engage in large-
scale, commercial piracy and not those who copy for private use.
I. INDUSTRY EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF DIGITAL COPYING
A. Copyright Owners' Concerns About Digital Copying and Consumer
Perceptions Regarding the "Right" to Share Digital Content
Advances in technology over the past three or four decades
have been both a blessing and a curse to creators and distributors of
creative works. For those who create artistic works, technology has
made it cheaper and easier to record a song, produce a film, or write a
novel.23 Advances in technology have also made it easier for artists to
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524-27 (1994);
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
23. In 1999, for example, musician Moby recorded the album "Play" in his bedroom; it
went on to sell almost ten million copies. Biography, MOBY.COM, http://www.moby.comlbiography
(last visited July 18, 2010). See also Owen Gleiberman, Cold Comfort, ENT. WKLY, Feb. 6, 2004,
at 118; Up Close and Personal, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 21, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/
2004/may/21/cannes2004.cannesfilmfestival (describing how film director Jonathan Caouette
made the film Tarnation for $213.72 using iMovie software, combining home movies, answering-
machine messages, and still photos into a work that earned critical acclaim at the 2004 Cannes
Film Festival); Ethan Smith, Organization Moby, WIRED, May 2002, http://www.wired.com/
wiredlarchive/10.05/moby.html (discussing Moby's home recording studio, where he recorded his
CD "18" using two Macintosh computers); The Craft of Writing, www.SCOTrrTURow.COM,
http://www.scottturow.com (follow "Scott Talks" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (quoting
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distribute their works to the public, making them less reliant upon
corporate distributors such as record labels, video distributors, and
book publishers. 24
While artists have benefitted from the advances in technology
that assist in the creative process, these same advances have made it
easier for others to copy and distribute artists' works without their
consent and without compensating them. Both the hardware and
software needed to copy music, films, and computer programs are
readily and inexpensively available to the public. 2 5  Thus, not only
does the typical consumer of entertainment and software products
have the ability to reproduce copyrighted works for personal use, but
copyright "pirates" need only invest a minimal stake to make
thousands of illegal copies that can then be sold on the street or at flea
markets.2 6
The music, film, and software industries claim that
unauthorized digital copying has resulted in hundreds of millions of
dollars in lost profits over the last ten years. 27 While these industries
Scott Turow as saying "I think that my career as a writer owes a lot to the fact that the computer
can organize all of it. You just move all of those blocks of text around.").
24. For example, musicians now post samples of their music on proprietary websites and
include links to sites where their recordings can be purchased, and short film directors post their
works on the Internet to create a fan-base of Internet users and enhance their opportunities to
work on full-length features. See, e.g., Working on a Dream, BRUCESPRINGSTEEN.NET, http://www.
brucespringsteen.net/albums/workingonadream.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (offering
streaming audio of songs on Springsteen's most recent CD, with links to song lyrics and sites to
purchase music). Similarly, aspiring filmmakers have posted short films online to generate
publicity. See Marion Hart, A Comeback for Short Films Is Linked to the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/14/movies/film-a-comeback-for-short-films-is-linked-
to-the-web.html.
25. See Damon Lussier, Beyond Napster: Online Music Distribution and the Future of
Copyright, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 25, 26-28 (2001) (discussing online technologies that
make the transfer of audio files over the Internet quick and easy).
26. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1031-32 (2001) (describing the manner in which technological advances have "transformed
intellectual property theft"); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1373-79 (2004) (describing
the changing economics of copyright infringement in light of a technology shift from analog to
digital media, leading to more illegal copies and more copyright pirates in digital era than in
analog era).
27. See RECORDING INDUS. AsS'N OF AM., RIAA 2003 YEAR-END STATISTICS (2003)
(indicating a steady reduction in units sold every year from 1999 through 2003, with a reduction
in shipment value of close to two billion dollars in 2003 as compared to 1999) (copy on file with
author); Press Release, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Statement Thanking the Vice President and
Obama Administration for Hosting a Meeting on Protection of Intellectual Property (Dec. 15,
2009), available at http://www.mpaa.org/resources/2658eb30-809f-4368-b85f-eaaO376Oa8bb.pdf
(estimating that piracy deprives U.S. copyright owners in excess of $25 billion per year); For
Students Doing Reports, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS'N OF AM., http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last
visited Aug. 2, 2010) (citing study reporting global music piracy causing annual economic loss of
$12.5 billion); Global Software Piracy Study, Bus. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://portal.bsa.org/
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have always lost some potential profits to piracy, digital technology
has made it much easier and cheaper to mass-produce illegal copies
for profit, because digital copying requires only relatively inexpensive
equipment and limited space, and because digital reproductions are
perfect copies that can be mass-reproduced without losing quality. 28
The advent of P2P file sharing and MP3 technology has made it even
easier to make and transfer unauthorized copies, because music, films,
and software can now be downloaded relatively quickly at little or no
cost and then saved in compact files for later use, reuse, and copying. 29
The relative ease with which unauthorized copies of digital works may
be produced and widely distributed poses a threat to the
entertainment and software industries that profit from digital works.
That many of those who download copyrighted works without
permission believe they should be permitted to do so and do not view
their conduct as wrong greatly compounds the problem faced by the
music, film, and software industries as a result of digital copying.
Those who "share"30 files online have provided numerous justifications
for their conduct, including: (1) the fair use doctrine permits copying
for personal use; (2) digital entertainment is overpriced and artists are
overpaid; and (3) the media monopolies that control the distribution of
entertainment works are inherently bad. 31
globalpiracy2009/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2010) (reporting that 43% of the software
installed on computers worldwide was illegally obtained in 2009, finding that for every $100 of
software sold worldwide, $75 in unlicensed software made its way onto computers, and reporting
the commercial value of unlicensed software in 2009 at $51.4 billion); Stephen E. Siwek, The
True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U.S. Economy, INST. FOR POL'Y INNOVATION (Oct. 3,
2007), http://www.ipi.org/ipi/IPIPublications.nsflPublicationLookupFullText/23F5FF3E9D8AA7
9786257369005BOC79 (reporting annual cost to the U.S. economy of $58 billion from copyright
piracy of motion pictures, sound recordings, video games, and business and entertainment
software). But see Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on
Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. EcON. 1 (2007) (reporting results of empirical
study by researchers at the Harvard Business School and the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill indicating that illegal downloading has little demonstrable impact in terms of
reducing sales of records and might, in fact, be a factor in increasing sales).
28. See generally Katyal, supra note 26 (describing the manner in which technological
advances have "transformed intellectual property theft").
29. See id. (describing the low costs involved in making illegal copies of digital works).
30. Representatives of the entertainment industry have opposed the use of the term
"sharing" and still prefer to use terms like "stealing," "theft," and "piracy." See, e.g., Jessica
Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 24 n. 94 (Fall 2004); Karla S.
Lambert, Note, Unflagging Television Piracy, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1324, n.44 (2006).
31. See TWEENS AND TEENS, supra note 1 (summarizing results of 2004 survey of 1183
respondents, ages 8-18, showing that 51% of the respondents believe it is okay to download
software from the Internet without paying for it because they cannot afford it; 35% because they
would not use it if they had to pay for it; 33% because "lots of people do it"; 26% because "it
doesn't hurt anybody when I do this"; 19% because no one has ever told them not to; 15% because
"it isn't something I would ever get in trouble for doing"; and 8% because their parents have said
it is okay for them to do it); Jensen, supra note 1, at 539-44 (2003) (explaining that individuals
choose to disobey copyright law because of the ethereal nature of copyright, its lack of legitimacy,
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The first justification is incorrect as a matter of law, at least as
copyright law has been interpreted to date. The Supreme Court
suggested in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. that
copying for personal use can be a fair use, but only where the
particular use does not harm the owner or adversely affect the market
for the copyrighted work.32 Those cases that have addressed these
"private use" arguments in the context of P2P file-sharing networks
have soundly rejected the argument that fair use protects
unauthorized file sharing over the Internet. 33 Because an established
commercial market exists for digital music, and because unauthorized
downloading allows consumers to get for free what they would
otherwise have to purchase, downloading for personal use (and
perhaps uploading without permission from the copyright owner) 34
does not fall within the protections of fair use.3 5
its roots in positive law, and its reputation as the domain of specialists); Mark Bazer, An
Etiquette Lesson in File Sharing, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 2003, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2003-07-02/news/0307030190 1 smooth-jazz-oldie-but-goodie-major-record-labels; David
Greising, Recording Industry's Pursuit Is Off-Key, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2003, http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/2003-08-06/business/0308060386_1_downloading-music-companies-new-music-
business (citing overly high prices as a justification for illegal downloading); INST. FOR GLOBAL
ETHICS, supra note 13 (stating that illegal downloading is justified by teens because they see it
as a victimless crime).
32. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
33. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-91 (7th Cir. 2005); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2001). Although the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 provided an express exemption from liability for infringement for the
"noncommercial use by a consumer" of a digital or analog audio recording device or medium "for
making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings," 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006), this
exclusion from liability has been narrowly limited to the use of devices or media that are now
largely obsolete and does not apply to noncommercial consumer copying of musical recordings
onto CDs, MP3 devices, or computer hard drives. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Diamond Multimedia's Rio
portable digital recording device, which used MP3 technology to allow users to store and listen to
music files copied from the Internet or a compact disc from the types of devices covered by the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992); Kevin M. Dious, Note, Is Home Recording Dead? A
Discussion of the Atlantic v. XM Satellite Radio Litigation and Audio Home Recording Rights, 14
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269, 300-04 (2007) (noting that the AHRA has become "meaningless" in light
of its narrow scope, advances in technology, and interpretation by the courts). Even if some
protection remains for a narrow class of personal copying of musical works, the exemption
established by the Act has no application to personal copying of other types of works, such as
computer software or films. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (defining the terms of the statute to include
only musical recordings and excluding devices and media commonly used by consumers for
copying computer software, motion pictures, or other digital works).
34. Currently, there is some question about whether merely uploading copyrighted files
to the Internet can constitute "distributing" the files for purposes of infringement. See Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216-27 (D. Minn. 2008) (evaluating arguments
supporting and opposing interpretation of "distribution" to include merely making materials
available on the Internet without evidence of actual downloading by others and holding that
"distribution" requires more than merely making copyrighted works available online).
35. A&MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1017.
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The next two consumer justifications reflect understandable
frustration with the way the music business operates, 36 but the law
does not recognize these excuses as valid reasons for avoiding liability.
It is simply not a defense to copyright infringement for the copier to
assert that the creator does not receive enough of the purchase price,
that the price is too high, that the seller is too rich, or that "everyone
else is doing it."37 These arguments presume an absolute right to
enjoy access to copyrighted works that is not supported by the
Copyright Act or its constitutional underpinnings. In fact, the law has
always balanced the rights of authors to control the distribution of
their works with the public interest in accessing them, and has never
found either to be absolute. 38  Therefore, consumers who want
copyrighted works-and whose use of the works would not constitute a
fair use-must either pay the requested price or go without. 39
36. A detailed discussion of the structure and operation of the industries governing the
recording and distribution of music is beyond the scope of this Article. Many fine books and
articles that explain, analyze, and critique the business practices of the music industry have
already been published. See, e.g., M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS
OF MUSIc: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY (Robert Nirkind ed., 10th ed. 2007);
RUSSELL SANJEK & DAVID SANJEK, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN: THE AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC
BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996); MICHAEL J. WOLF, THE ENTERTAINMENT
ECONOMY: How MEGA-MEDIA FORCES ARE TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES (2000) (discussing the hit-
driven business models that govern the film and music industries and the effect of digital
distribution on those models); Revella Cook, The Impact of Digital Distribution on the Duration
of Recording Contracts, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 41-42 (2003) (explaining how the music
business model often leaves musicians-even those with hit songs-in debt); Note, California
Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists' Contracts, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2632, 2637-39
(2003) (critically discussing record companies' treatment of artists); Corrina Cree Clover,
Comment, Accounting Accountability: Should Record Labels Have a Fiduciary Duty to Report
Accurate Royalties to Recording Artists?, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 395 (2003) (explaining the
recording artist royalty system and the record labels' tendency to misrepresent the amount
artists should be paid).
37. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 891 (rejecting defendant's argument that
"other persons were greater offenders" as a defense to infringement for downloading); Grand
Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(rejecting as specious defendant's argument that sampling is a general practice in the rap
recording industry and thus excuses infringement); 143 CONG. REC. H9883 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1997) (statement of Rep. Cannon) (supporting enactment of the No Electronic Theft Act by
stating, "Playing Robin Hood may have made sense when the Sheriff of Nottingham was
extracting tribute from the peasantry, but playing Robin Hood on the Internet is a recipe for
disaster for our domestic software industry.").
38. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-208, 211-14 (2003) (discussing the balance
between the limited monopoly granted to authors of creative works in order to promote creative
activity and the manner in which the limited monopoly rights had been expanded over the years
by Congress); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524-27 (1994) (discussing the policies
underlying the Copyright Act and Copyright Clause of the Constitution); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (discussing the balance of interests
reflected in the grant of copyright and the fact that copyright owners' monopoly is not absolute).
39. An exception might occur where the defendant in a copyright infringement suit is
able to prove that the plaintiff misused its copyright or had unclean hands. See generally 4
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09 (Matthew Bender, ed.,
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In short, these consumer justifications are not recognized as
legitimate defenses for violating copyright owners' rights. In spite of
this, tens of millions of Americans continue to engage in unauthorized
downloading of copyrighted works on a regular basis,40 because the
prevailing social norm simply does not recognize copyright
infringement as being wrong, at least in the form of P2P file sharing.41
B. The Industry Strikes Back
The entertainment industry's response to the prevailing social
norm has been largely inadequate in providing an alternative to
illegal file sharing, with far too heavy an emphasis on deterrence. The
"4customer is wrong" approach initially adopted by the industry made
it slow to respond to consumer demands, and the severity of sanctions
now available as a result of its successful efforts to amend the
copyright law threatens to undermine the industry's efforts to change
the prevailing view that copyright infringement is not "wrong," at
least when committed by the average citizen with no commercial
motive.
1. The "Customer is Wrong" Approach
In spite of the threat to copyright interests posed by the advent
of digital technology, the entertainment industry was initially slow to
develop business models that satisfied consumer demand for easy
access to digital works in multiple formats. Consumers demanded
easy, inexpensive access to digital works with the ability to use
2010). While the application of the antitrust laws to the business practices of the film, music, and
software industries, as well as the dramatically increased vertical and horizontal consolidation of
the entertainment industry over the past decade, are outside the scope of this Article, courts may
begin reaching the misuse of copyright defense in more cases as copyright owners seek to impose
liability on "deep pocket" secondary infringers. See Patrick M. Cox, Note, What Goes Up Must
Come Down: Grounding the Dizzying Height of Vertical Mergers in the Entertainment Industry,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1996) (analyzing whether antitrust laws should be used to prevent
vertical mergers in the entertainment industry); Anthony Maul, Note, Are the Major Labels
Sandbagging Online Music? An Antitrust Analysis of Strategic Licensing Practices, 7 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 365 (2003-04) (describing as "collusive" the environment among record
labels that resulted in effort to shut down online P2P networks).
40. See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 30, at 40; Kate Leadbetter,
Rights Group Defends P2P in Ad Campaign, ZDNET (July 1, 2003, 3:26 PM),
http://news.zdnet.co.uklinternet0,39020
3 6 9 , 2 13 6 87 2 ,00.htm (quoting Fred von Lohmann,
Electronic Frontier Foundation Senior Staff Attorney in stating that more than 60 million
Americans use online P2P file-sharing software).
41. See Jensen, supra note 1; Katyal, supra note 26.
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multiple media for access and storage.42 The initial efforts by record
companies to sell their products online generally failed; consumers
complained that the first online stores offered too limited a selection,
were too expensive, and were unwieldy to use.43 In the last several
years, companies like iTunes and Rhapsody have begun to meet these
consumer demands by creating licensed sites that provide a viable
alternative to unlicensed P2P file sharing,44 but the entertainment
industry asserts that increases in legal downloads have still not come
close to replacing sales of works that have been (and will continue to
be) lost to illegal, online file sharing.45
Rather than focusing their attention on ways to meet
consumers' demands and compete with "free" products, the music,
film, and software industries devoted most of their initial efforts to
trying to thwart copying. They lobbied for additional copyright
protections and punishments for infringement; litigated against the
companies that produced the hardware and software that made digital
copying possible;46 worked to develop copy protection technology for
42. See Warren Cohen, CD Burning: How the Labels are Trying to Stop You, ROLLING
STONE, June 20, 2002, at 43-44 (discussing negative consumer reaction to publishers' attempts
to sell CDs equipped with copy-protection); Devin Leonard, The Music Men Are Out of Tune,
FORTUNE, June 11, 2001, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2001/06/11/
304638/index.htm (discussing the inadequacy of record company online distribution sites, which
did not allow consumers to use the music they purchased in most of the many ways in which
consumers wanted to use it).
43. Pui-Wing Tam & Anna Wilde Mathews, Apple Polishes Its Music Service, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 14, 2003, at B1 (discussing announcement of Apple's planned online distribution site and
noting that preexisting record industry sites like PressPlay and MusicNet were criticized as "too
cumbersome" and too limited in both breadth of songs offered and permitted uses of purchased
songs); see also David Browne, Wal-Mart Music Downloads, ENT. WKLY, Apr. 16, 2004,
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/O,,609612,00.html (criticizing Wal-Mart's entry into the online
musical distribution business because of its limited availability of musical selections).
44. See Noah Robischon, Big Mac Attack: Apple Gets Down With Music Fans - to the
Tune of Millions, ENT. WKLY, May 16, 2003, at 14; Brad Stone, The Music Streams that Soothe
an Industry, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/
business/26stream.html; Brennon Slattery, Music Streaming Chips Away at Illegal File-Sharing,
TODAY @ PC WORLD (July 13, 2009, 9:32 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/168923/music
streaming chips away at illegal filesharing.html.
45. See Siwek, supra note 27 (giving data summarizing economic losses due to pirated
music); Marguerite Reardon, Oops! They're Swapping Again, CNET NEWS, (Jan. 16, 2004),
http://news.cnet.com/Oops-Theyre-swapping-again/2100-1027_3-5142382.html (noting that
several high profile legal music download sites were launched in 2004); John Borland, How Much
is Digital Music Worth?, CNET NEWS (Dec. 8, 2003), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027_3-
5117275.html; John Borland, Microsoft Music Store to Open Next Year, CNET NEWS (Nov. 17,
2003), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027_3-5108173.html.
46. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
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their digital works;47 and tried to educate the public about the evils of
unauthorized copying.48 For several years, the RIAA filed thousands
of civil lawsuits against individuals allegedly using P2P file-sharing
technology to make sound recordings available to other P2P users over
the Internet.49
No single effort by the entertainment industry solved the
problem faced by copyright owners, but together these measures have
combined to provide the industry with some potent weapons that it
has begun wielding to recover losses from big pockets and to deter
future infringement. As discussed in Part III, this strategy ignores
the dangers of excessive penalties for what is "essentially an economic
offense,"50 in terms of both deterrence theory and the public interest in
access to creative works.
2. The Industry's Success in Altering Legal Norms to Provide
Severe Penalties for Infringement
Although the industry's education, digital rights management,
and litigation strategies have not greatly affected the social
acceptance of illegal file sharing,5 1 the industry's lobbying efforts
during the last three decades met with little resistance 52 and have led
47. See generally John Borland, Labels to Dampen CD Burning?, CNET NEWS (June 2,
2004), http://news.cnet.comfLabels-to-dampen-CD-burning/2 100-1027_3-5224090.html (discuss-
ing plans by music companies to move forward to incorporate copy protection technology into a
majority of CDs sold in the U.S. and the U.K.). Because of the strong consumer dislike for copy
protection technology, the industry's effort to prevent copying through copy protection technology
has largely proved unsuccessful. See generally, Cohen, supra note 42 (discussing industry efforts
to implement copy protection to prevent illegal copying and the complaints of consumers
regarding inability to make copies for personal use). In fact, although the record labels' licensing
agreements with iTunes required that digital rights management (DRM) technology be included
in MP3 files sold through the site, labels abandoned DRM protections in their distribution deals
with Amazon when it entered the market. See Antone Gonsalves, Amazon Adds Fourth Major
Record Label to DRM-Free Music Store, INFO. WK., http://www.informationweek.com/news/
global-cio/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=205602334.
48. See, e.g., Brooks Boliek, H'wood Steps Up AntiPiracy Fight: Trailers, Ads Flood
Theaters, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., July 23, 2003; Greg Hernandez, Movie Piracy Ads Set Sail, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, June 16, 2004, at B, available at 2004 WLNR 2851345.
49. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also William Glanz, Music Pirates
Turn Up Volume Recording Industry Suits Fail to Squelch Use of Online Services, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2004, at C17 (reporting that file sharing "remains widespread" in spite of the RIAA's
lawsuits against almost 5000 individual file sharers and noting that file sharing appeared to
have increased in the past year).
50. H.R. REP. No. 93-1581, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6849, 6852.
51. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also John Boudreau, Illegal File
Sharing Showing No Letup, SEATTLE TIMES, July 3, 2006, http://community.seattletimes.
nwsource.com/archive/?date=20060703&slug=btfilesharing03.
52. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857 (1987) (discussing the role of industry lobbyists in crafting revisions to copyright law,
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to significant changes in the legal norms governing penalties for
infringement of copyrighted entertainment works. Music industry
lobbyists have achieved the most striking increase in legal protection
for sound recordings, particularly given that federal law has protected
sound recordings for fewer than forty years. 53  Before Congress
extended federal copyright protection to sound recordings in 1971,
"pirates" faced infringement suits by the owners of the underlying
musical compositions, but no federal criminal sanctions punished this
conduct. 54 Since 1971, criminal penalties for copyright infringement
have grown from misdemeanor sanctions (fines of up to $1,000 and
imprisonment of up to one year) to felony sentences, even for first-time
offenders, including fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment, with
repeat felony offenders subject to imprisonment for up to ten years.55
In addition, the specter of treble damages and additional criminal
penalties under RICO now augment the existing civil and criminal
copyright infringement remedies. 56
disadvantaging those whose interests were not represented in the process); Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) (noting that the
important role given to existing copyright owners in the drafting process made the law unwieldy
and ambiguous when applied to new technologies); Shahram A. Shayesteh, Comment, High-
Speed Chase on the Information Superhighway: The Evolution of Criminal Liability for Internet
Piracy, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 183, 221-26 (1999) (criticizing the underrepresentation of interests
of general public in enactment of NET Act and DMCA). It is only recently that an organized
effort has been made on behalf of those who wish to have freer access to digital works over the
Internet to participate in the legislative process. See, e.g., DIGITAL CONSUMER, http://www.digital
consumer.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010); About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
http://www.eff.org/about (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
53. Before 1971, only a hodge-podge of state laws provided makers of sound recordings
with any protection against the copying and sale of records without the makers' permission. See
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77 (codified as amended in 17
U.S.C.) (showing that federal copyright protection did not extend to sound recordings); S. 92-72,
92d Cong. (1st Sess. 1971) ("The enactment of S. 646 will mark the first recognition in American
copyright law of sound recordings as copyrightable works."). After years of lobbying Congress to
obtain copyright protection for sound recordings, the recording industry finally achieved partial
success in 1971, when the Sound Recording Act of 1971 was enacted. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat.
391 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). However, owners of sound
recordings did not receive the entire "bundle" of rights to which owners of other works were
entitled; rights in sound recordings were originally limited to the rights of duplication,
distribution, and preparation of derivative works, with limited digital performance rights only
recently added to the bundle. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2006).
54. See Sound Recording Act of 1971 § 2 (adding criminal penalties for the infringement
of musical composition copyrights); Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting
that although no criminal sanctions previously existed for sound recordings, the 1971
amendment to the Copyright Act permitted retroactive application of criminal penalties for
infringement of musical composition copyrights).
55. Copyright Act of 1909 §§ 28, 29; see also United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp.
535, 539 (D. Mass. 1994) (discussing history of criminal copyright infringement provisions).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006).
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The availability of substantial civil damages and criminal
penalties for copyright infringement, though a relatively new
development in copyright law, has been increasing dramatically over
the past thirty-five years.57  For civil infringement claims, the
Copyright Act of 1976 provides for a prevailing plaintiff to recover
both actual damages and the defendant's profits,5 8 or, alternatively,
statutory damages. 59 Currently, the minimum statutory damage
award is $750 for each act of knowing infringement, triple the initial
rate of $250 Congress had set in 1976.60 Congress likewise raised the
maximum statutory damage award threefold over the same period of
time61 to $30,000 for each act of infringement. 62 In addition, the
maximum statutory damage award may increase to $150,000 where
the infringement is willful, an amount thrice that of 1976.63 The
57. Others have already traced the evolution of the civil and criminal copyright
infringement provisions at length. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, §§ 14,
15.01[B] (explaining remedies available for civil and criminal copyright infringement and tracing
evolution of these remedies). See also Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An
Historical Analysis of Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367 (2002) (tracing the
expansion of civil liability and evolution of statutory damage provisions in civil cases); Lydia
Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal
Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. UNIV. L.Q.
835 (1999); Aaron M. Bailey, Comment, A Nation of Felons?: Napster, the NET Act, and the
Criminal Prosecution of File-Sharing, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 473 (2000) (discussing extension of
criminal liability for copyright infringement and possibility of criminal prosecution of P2P file-
sharers under § 506); Shayesteh, supra note 52, at 200-12 (reviewing the evolution of criminal
penalties for copyright infringement); Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the
Digital Era, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1705 (1999). Thus, this Article does not attempt to review in any
detail what prior articles have already accomplished, and instead focuses its attention more on
the remedies available under current law.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b); see Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir.
1981). See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 14.01 (describing monetary remedies
available in civil suits for copyright infringement).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Prevailing parties in civil actions may also recover an award of
attorneys' fees and costs, as well as injunctive relief and orders providing for the impounding and
destruction of infringing articles. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 503(a)-(b), 505.
60. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), with Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §
504(c)(1), 90 Stat. 2541, 2585. The 1976 Act did not change the statutory minimum, which was
$250 in the Copyright Act of 1909. Compare Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(b), with Copyright Act of
1976 § 504(c)(1).
61. See Copyright Act of 1976 § 504(c)(1) (setting maximum statutory award of $10,000).
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, the maximum statutory damage amount was $5,000. Copyright
Act of 1909 § 25(b).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
63. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), with Copyright Act of 1976 § 504(c)(1). Where several
works are infringed or where there are numerous incidents of infringement of even a single
work, statutory damage awards can reach in the millions of dollars. See, e.g., MCA Television
Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766 (11th Cir. 1996) (awarding $9 million in statutory damages where
defendant engaged in 900 separate infringing telecasts); Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc.,
909 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming award of $4 million in statutory damages, comprised of
80 separate awards of the then-maximum $50,000 statutory damage award for willful
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legislative history relating to these increases in available statutory
damages indicates an intent to deter piracy by ensuring that "the cost
of infringement . .. substantially exceed[s] the cost of compliance so
that those who use or distribute intellectual property have incentive to
comply with the law."6 4
Criminal penalties for copyright infringement have also
dramatically increased in the last three and a half decades.
Originally, only misdemeanor penalties, small fines, and forfeiture
were available as punishment for criminal infringement. 65 In fact,
lobbyists for the music, motion picture, and publishing industries led
unsuccessful efforts to increase the available criminal remedies for
many years after the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act.6 6 In 1974,
Congress opted to leave the maximum imprisonment term for first-
time criminal infringement unchanged67 but elevated criminal
infringement by repeat offenders to felony status for the first time.68
infringement); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0472 (JSR), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17907 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2000) (awarding $53,400,000 in statutory damages); Nat'l Cable
Television Ass'n. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 653 (D.D.C. 1991) (awarding $2 million
in statutory damages). But see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045,
1053-54, 1061 (D. Minn. 2010) (reducing statutory damage award to $2250 per infringing song,
in lieu of $80,000 per song, and stating "[t]he need for deterrence cannot justify a $2 million
verdict for stealing and illegally distributing 24 songs for the sole purpose of obtaining free
music").
64. 145 CONG. REC. H12884 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Berman); see also
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 2000 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 11 28,141 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (determining that the appropriate award of statutory damages in the case was $25,000 per
willfully infringed CD despite the absence of any evidence that defendant profited from the
infringement, because it was necessary to deter others who might engage in Internet piracy).
65. Copyright Act of 1909 §§ 28, 29, 32; see also United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F.
Supp. 535, 539 (D. Mass. 1994) (discussing history of criminal copyright infringement
provisions).
66. See WILLIAM S. STRAUSS, STUDY NO. 24: REMEDIES OTHER THAN DAMAGES FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, (U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1960), available at http://www.copyright.
gov/history/studies/study24.pdf (describing legislative history of Copyright Act relating to
remedies other than damages and noting un-enacted legislation that would have reduced or
eliminated criminal penalties); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw (COMM. PRINT 1963)
(including testimony by representatives of the music publishing, motion picture, and book
publishing industries complaining about the lack of responsiveness of the Justice Department in
pursuing criminal penalties despite multiple infringements causing great damages because of
the fact that criminal copyright infringement was only a misdemeanor offense, arguing that the
law should be revised to create felony liability, particularly for repeat offenders).
67. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1581, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6849, 6852
(explaining Congress' reluctance to adopt the proposed three-year and seven-year maximum
imprisonment penalties for first-time and repeat offenders, respectively, because criminal
copyright infringement "is essentially an economic offense").
68. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 102(2), 88 Stat. 1873 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). One factor that led to increased criminal sanctions
after recognition of a federal copyright in sound recordings in the 1970s was the exponential
74 VANDERBILT J OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 13:1:55
Since 1974, Congress has increased sanctions for criminal
infringement incrementally but significantly. 69 Not only are first-time
offenders now subject to felony penalties of up to five years in prison
for criminal infringement, with a possibility of ten years imprisonment
for repeat felony offenders,7 o but the maximum fine for criminal
infringement by an individual defendant has escalated from $25,000
in 1976 to $250,000 today.71 Each incremental increase in criminal
sanctions for copyright infringement over the past thirty-five years
generated at least some Congressional debate, and several bills
proposing even more dramatic increases in available penalties for
criminal infringement failed to emerge from committee. 72 However, a
growth experienced by the recording industry in the prior two decades and the resulting
escalation in the amount of money the industry claimed to be losing to piracy every year. See
H.R. REP. No. 93-1581 at 3 (explaining Congress' support for a "very substantial proposed
increase in penalties" for criminal copyright infringement in the 1974 amendments to the 1909
Act because "record piracy is so profitable that ordinary penalties fail to deter prospective
offenders"); S. REP. No. 97-274, at 3-6 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 127, 129-33
(explaining the need for increased criminal penalties for infringement in light of the great
economic loss to copyright owners from piracy and great potential for profit to infringers and
noting the Department of Justice's estimate that "worldwide sales in pirated sound recordings
totaled $1.1 billion in 1980, $560 million of which occurred in North America").
69. See, e.g., No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(d), 111 Stat. 2678; (1997);
Criminal Penalties for Copyright Infringement, Pub. L. No. 102-561, § 1, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992).
See generally sources cited supra notes 57, 60.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006).
71. Compare Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 506(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2586,
with 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3) (2006). The harshness of the available statutory maximum sentences
for infringement of the reproduction or distribution rights of a copyrighted work varies
depending on whether the defendant had a for-profit motive, whether the defendant has previous
felony convictions, and whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual. See 17 U.S.C. §
506 (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 3571. Although increased criminal fines and jail terms were
initially limited to infringement of sound recordings and motion pictures, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88
Stat. 1873 (1974), these sanctions are now available for infringement of the reproduction or
distribution rights of any copyrighted work, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)-(c).
However, the felony provisions only apply to infringement of the reproduction and distribution
rights in the "bundle" of protected rights of copyright owners. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)-(c). Thus, only
misdemeanor penalties are available for violations of other rights, such as the performance right
and the right to prepare derivative works.
72. For example, in 2003, legislation was introduced in Congress that would have made
it a felony to place a single copy of a work on a computer network, essentially creating a
presumption that many copies, worth in excess of the felony threshold value, are made of every
work made available over the Internet for copying. See Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner
Protection and Security Act of 2003, H.R. 2752, 108th Cong. (2003). Other bills that would affect
criminal and civil penalties for copyright infringement were proposed but died in committee,
including one that would have expressly imposed criminal liability on secondary offenders who
"intentionally induce" criminal infringement, Inducing Infringements of Copyrights (INDUCE)
Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004), and one that would have greatly expanded the powers
of the Department of Justice in pursuing both criminal and civil offenders, Protecting
Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation (PIRATE) Act, S. 2237, 108th Cong. (2004).
Very similar bills introduced in 2006 and 2007 would have expressly provided for identical
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provision that more than doubled potential exposure for copyright
infringement slipped through Congress with no real debate in 1996
and has received little comment since then-the addition of copyright
infringement as a basis for civil and criminal RICO liability.
3. The Creation of RICO Liability for Copyright Infringement
In 1996, the severity of both civil and criminal sanctions
potentially applicable to copyright infringers increased dramatically
when Congress added criminal copyright infringement as a predicate
act for RICO liability.73 A defendant convicted of a RICO offense could
receive an additional twenty years of imprisonment and fines of up to
an additional $250,000,74 over and above the penalties available for
repeat criminal offenders under the Copyright Act, because a criminal
RICO violation is a separate offense from criminal copyright
infringement.75 In a civil copyright infringement lawsuit, a plaintiff
who proves civil RICO claims could recover not only the damages
allowable under the Copyright Act, but also treble damages under
RICO.76
Congress added criminal copyright infringement as a predicate
"racketeering" act for RICO liability as part of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Consumer Protection Act of 1996,77 which sought to "provide
additional tools to combat trademark and goods counterfeiting crimes
that cost our Nation billions of dollars per year." 8 This legislation
penalties for attempt and conspiracy to commit criminal copyright infringement as for the
underlying offense and would have doubled the maximum sentence for each level of offense.
Intellectual Property Enhanced Criminal Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 3155, 110th Cong.
(2007); Intellectual Property Enhanced Criminal Enforcement Act of 2006, H.R. 5921, 109th
Cong. (2006). While proposed legislation such as the bills mentioned above are beyond the scope
of this Article, the normative concerns discussed in Part IV, infra, are ones that should also be
taken into account as Congress considers further proposals to expand the scope of copyright
owners' rights and the penalties that are available for infringement.
73. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110
Stat. 1386.
74. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 3571(b)(3). Extensive forfeiture provisions are also included in
§ 1963(a), which require forfeiture of all interests acquired or maintained by the defendant in
violation of the RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 288 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir.
1979).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). It is unclear from the text of the statute whether the treble
damage provision would apply to an election of statutory remedies under the Copyright Act in
lieu of actual damages, but in light of the expansive interpretation given to RICO, See, e.g., H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), even statutory damages might be subject
to trebling.
77. See 110 Stat. at 1386.
78. 141 CONG. REC. S18594 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy). The
House Report notes that the purpose of the legislation "is to prevent counterfeiting of
75
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focused on enhancing the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2318 for
trafficking in counterfeit goods. 79 There was no legislative debate
regarding the addition of criminal copyright infringement as a RICO
predicate act, and Congress passed the legislation without objection.80
The legislative history of the bill adding copyright infringement
as a RICO predicate act makes clear that Congress failed to consider
the potential impact of the legislation on copyright infringement cases
unrelated to commercial counterfeiting. 81 In fact, the potential
implications are sweeping, largely because of ambiguities in the
criminal provisions of the Copyright Act as well as in the "enterprise"
and "pattern" provisions of RICO. 82
Prosecutorial discretion has limited the scope of criminal
copyright infringement prosecutions to those cases that fall readily
within what most would view as appropriate applications of criminal
copyrighted and trademarked goods and services and to ensure that counterfeit goods produced
elsewhere cannot enter the United States." H.R. REP. No. 104-556 at 1-2 (1995), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074, 1074-75. In the "Purpose and Summary" section of the House Report,
no reference is made to the addition of criminal copyright infringement as a predicate act for
RICO purposes; it simply states, "H.R. 2511 includes trafficking in counterfeit goods or services
as predicate offenses subject to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
provisions of the criminal code." Id. at 2. Similarly, the Senate Report omits any mention of a
need for further punishment of criminal copyright infringement, focusing on the "phenomenal
growth of the crime of counterfeiting" and the involvement of organized crime in "the
manufacturing, distributing, selling, and financing of counterfeit products." S. REP. No. 104-177
at 3 (1995).
79. 110 Stat. at 1387-88.
80. 141 CONG. REC. S6302-03 (daily ed. June 14, 1996); 141 CONG. REC. H5780 (daily ed.
June 4, 1996); see also 141 CONG. REC. H5777 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Moorehead) (commenting that he is unaware of any opposition to H.R. 2511); 141 Cong. Rec.
H5778 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (emphasizing the "very bipartisan,
nonconfrontational fashion" in which the committee moved to advance the legislation).
81. The official title of the legislation provided that its driving purpose was "[t]o control
and prevent commercial counterfeiting." S. 1136, 104th Cong. (1995). The crimes other than
copyright infringement that were added as predicate acts for RICO purposes all involved
commercial "trafficking" in counterfeit goods and services. 110 Stat. at 1386. Statements in
support of the bill emphasized the high profits earned by those who engage in trademark and
copyright counterfeiting; there was no discussion of copying of copyrighted material for private
use or other noncommercial purposes. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H5777 (daily ed. June 4, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Moorehead) ("The combination of high profits and low risk of prosecution has
made trademark and copyright counterfeiting a favorite activity of organized crime syndicates.");
141 CONG. REC. H5778 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) ("Because there is
an enormous potential for profit in illegal counterfeiting, the civil and criminal remedies must be
strong if we are to deter counterfeiting."); 141 CONG. REC. H5779 (daily ed. June 4, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("[C]ounterfeiting is a highly lucrative, but relatively low-risk
crime with only hand-slap penalties if caught."). Those who spoke in support of the legislation
repeatedly noted the need for the bill's strengthened enforcement provisions to "make it easier to
combat commercial counterfeiting." 141 CONG. REC. H5778 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Schroeder).
82. See infra Part II.
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sanctions for copyright infringement. 83 However, as civil RICO claims
become more common in civil copyright actions, the addition of
criminal copyright infringement to the list of RICO predicate acts will
likely extend to civil cases far beyond the realm of "commercial
counterfeiting." This is largely because, as interpreted and amended
to date, the Copyright Act's criminal infringement provision requires
little additional proof once civil copyright infringement is established.
In many cases, once criminal infringement is established, it would not
be difficult to meet the additional requirements of a civil RICO claim.
The next Part discusses the manner in which a civil infringement suit
can be converted into a civil RICO case; the following Part will then
discuss the normative concerns raised by the possibility of widespread
application of the civil RICO statute to copyright infringement cases.
II. THE POTENTIAL EASE WITH WHICH COPYRIGHT DISPUTES CAN BE
CONVERTED INTO CIVIL RICO LAWSUITS
Plaintiffs in copyright actions now have a potent additional
remedy under the RICO Act, and little additional evidence is needed
in many cases to allege a civil RICO claim on top of an infringement
claim. Proof of civil RICO liability for copyright infringement requires
that a plaintiff establish (A) the predicate act of criminal copyright
infringement by the defendant and (B) the elements of one of four
possible bases for RICO liability. 84 Although cases asserting RICO
claims in addition to copyright infringement claims are starting to
move through the courts,85 reported copyright infringement cases
83. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 2008-2009, at
12-13 (2009) [hereinafter PRO IP], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
proipreport2009.pdf (describing successful prosecutions against online "warez" groups
responsible for initial online release of pirated software, music, video games, and movies,
including the "first-ever" P2P trial conviction against an operator of a web site that facilitated
illegal distribution of over two million downloads of unlicensed, copyrighted works); U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FY 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, at app. E (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2009/appdlapp-e.pdf (reflecting receipt by U.S.
Attorneys nationwide of 79 investigative matters under 18 U.S.C. § 2319, with 58 cases filed
against 75 defendants); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, at app. F (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2008/appd/
p254-285.pdf (reflecting receipt by U.S. Attorneys of 125 investigative matters under 18 U.S.C. §
2319, with 76 cases filed against 86 defendants); Intellectual Property Cases, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipcases.html#operations (last visited Aug. 5, 2010)
(listing cases prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2319).
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1964(c) (2006).
85. See, e.g., Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008)
(dismissing RICO claims based in part on copyright infringement due to lack of proximate cause
of damage to the plaintiff from the alleged infringements); CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Field, 612
F. Supp. 2d 660 (D. Md. 2009) (dismissing civil RICO claims based on criminal copyright
infringement for failure to adequately allege the "enterprise" requirement); Bryant v. Mattel,
77
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addressing RICO liability have thus far failed to resolve, or have
inconsistently addressed, numerous questions regarding the scope and
application of the criminal copyright infringement statute, as well as
the manner in which RICO might be interpreted in the context of
copyright infringement disputes.86  This Part discusses these
ambiguities in applying both the criminal copyright infringement
statute and RICO.
A. Proof of Criminal Copyright Infringement
To succeed in establishing criminal copyright infringement, a
plaintiff in a civil RICO case must prove (1) the elements of a civil
copyright infringement claim,87 plus two additional elements: (2) that
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (refusing to dismiss civil RICO claims based on
alleged predicate acts of criminal copyright infringement involving dispute over ownership of
Bratz dolls); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1127-28 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (denying motion to dismiss RICO claims based on copyright infringement but granting
motion for more definite statement regarding certain RICO claim allegations). In an informal
review of civil copyright infringement case filings in two federal districts during the period from
January, 2002 through June, 2003 using the PACER system, the author determined that about
2% of the complaints designated as primarily copyright infringement cases also included a civil
RICO claim based on infringement as a predicate act. A similar survey of the period from
January, 2009 through June, 2010 yielded comparable results, although the federal courts'
system for designating the subject matter of cases makes it difficult to accurately track
information about the combination of claims alleged in filed cases. See RICO Reform Act of 1989:
Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. On Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Gerard L. Lynch) (discussing
difficulties in assessing true number of civil RICO cases because of single-claim designation form
used by Administrative Office of U.S. Courts in tracking substantive nature of cases).
86. Compare Perfect 10, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28 (refusing to dismiss civil RICO
claim against defendant, which served as a "gatekeeper" for fee-based Internet pornography
websites, alleged to contribute to and benefit from copyright infringement of photographs owned
by plaintiff that were allegedly used without permission by defendant's linked websites), with
Stewart v. Wachowski, No. CV 03-2873 M1M (VBKx) 2005 WL 6184235 (C.D. Cal. June 14,
2005) (dismissing civil RICO claims against defendant alleged to have violated copyright of
screenwriter, finding that legislative history of Copyright Act shows no Congressional intent to
expand RICO liability for copyright infringement beyond defendants engaged in counterfeiting or
piracy and thus that "run-of-the-mill" acts of copyright infringement that do not amount to
piracy or counterfeiting cannot support a civil RICO claim). One author has briefly addressed
some of these ambiguities in the context of peer-to-peer file sharing, see Stuller, supra note 18,
but the discussion below provides a more detailed analysis and discussion of the relevant case
law and considers recent developments in the law, particularly with respect to the RICO
"enterprise" requirement and the problems in attempting to impose civil RICO liability against
secondary infringers that create even greater uncertainty for defendants evaluating their
potential liability; this Article also reaches a different conclusion, focusing on the normative
concerns raised by the addition of RICO remedies to the already heavy arsenal of remedies
available to copyright plaintiffs.
87. "Reduced to most fundamental terms, there are only two elements necessary to the
plaintiffs case in an infringement action: ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff and copying
by the defendant." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, §13.01, at 13-5. Of course, proof of civil
2010] RICO LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 79
the copyright was infringed "willfully," and (3) that such infringement
was done for profit, involved reproduction or distribution of one or
more copies that exceeded $1,000 in value during any 180-day period,
or constituted a public distribution over a computer network of a work
known to be intended for commercial distribution.88
The following subsections focus on the issues plaintiffs would
most likely raise in cases asserting RICO claims along with civil
infringement claims and apply the criminal copyright infringement
statute in the context of P2P sharing of copyrighted files Ultimately,
this section concludes that many civil copyright infringement
plaintiffs, if successful in proving civil infringement, would likely also
prove the elements of criminal infringement necessary for imposing
additional civil penalties under RICO.
1. Requirement of Copyright Infringement
While the necessary elements for proving this component of
criminal copyright infringement are outside the scope of this article, 89
if civil copyright infringement cannot be established, neither can
criminal infringement.90 Thus, RICO liability could only be imposed
in a civil lawsuit where the plaintiff first succeeds on a claim of civil
copyright infringement.91 In addition, the same doctrines that would
negate a claim of civil copyright infringement are available to defeat
infringement can be a complex matter in light of the many formalities of copyright law, see id. §
15.01[a][2], at 15-4, and thus the proof required for success in a civil infringement claim is well
beyond the scope of this Article. What is of most concern here is not how a civil infringement
claim can be pled and proved in the first place, but how much more is required to convert that
claim into a civil racketeering claim under RICO.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006); see also United States v. Steele, 785 F.2d 743, 747-48 (9th
Cir. 1986) (noting with approval jury instructions requiring that defendant infringe copyright
willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain in order to be guilty
of criminal infringement); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that government's burden of proof in criminal copyright infringement action is to demonstrate (1)
infringement of copyright, including the absence of a first sale; (2) done willfully and (3) for
profit); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 15.01 (2002) (noting that criminal infringement is
identical to civil infringement claim with the additional requirements of willfulness and intent to
profit, but suggesting that profit requirement has been redefined to be "almost non-existent").
89. Stated generally, civil copyright infringement liability requires proof of "(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)); see 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). See
generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, §§ 13.01-13.03 (2004) (analyzing the elements of a
civil copyright infringement suit); Douglas YBaro, The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for
Copyright Infringement, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 285 (1999) (comparing the Second and Ninth
Circuit standards for establishing copyright infringement, with a discussion of the law in the
remaining circuits).
90. Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 506; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1964(c) (2006).
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this element of criminal infringement, including fair use defense and
the first sale doctrine. 92
The prototypical file-sharing defendant, such as those in the
many RIAA lawsuits filed from September 2003 through December
2008, will have engaged in conduct that meets this element of criminal
copyright infringement. Such a defendant will have directly copied a
protected work without the consent of the owner, and neither the first
sale doctrine nor the fair use defense will apply to prevent civil
infringement liability.93 Less clear is whether this element would be
met in the case of a secondary infringer, who does not engage in direct
copying but who makes it possible for others to do so.94 Section 506(a)
makes reference to "any person who infringes a copyright"; on its face,
this language seems to apply only to direct infringers, but at least
some secondary infringers might arguably fall within its reach. 95
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing that fair uses of copyrighted work are not
infringement); Wise, 550 F.2d at 1194 (holding that in addition to proving copying that was
intentionally done in violation of the law, the prosecution had the burden of proving that
defendant knew that the film he had sold was not the subject of a first sale by the copyright
owner). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (codifying the first sale doctrine, which provides that the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord that is lawfully made may sell or otherwise dispose of
his/her copy or phonorecord without the consent of the copyright owner, limiting the copyright
owner's distribution right to the first sale of each copy).
93. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that there could be little dispute that the individual file sharers taking advantage of
the Napster service were engaged in direct copyright infringement and that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed in proving that Napster's users were not engaged in fair use of the copyrighted
material). See generally Lisa J. Beyer Sims, Mutiny on the Net: Ridding P2P Pirates of Their
Booty, 52 EMORY L.J. 1907, 1914-26 (2003) (discussing the availability of the fair use defense for
P2P file sharing and concluding that those who distribute copyrighted works online via P2P
systems cannot avail themselves of the fair use defense and that only a small number of P2P
downloaders, who already own a copy of the downloaded work but who wish to use an MP3
version of the work for personal use, may successfully assert the fair use defense).
94. The imposition of secondary liability in civil cases includes an added layer of
complexity where the defendants are Internet Service Providers who may be protected by the
"safe harbor" provisions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)
(protecting ISPs who merely store infringing material without the ISP's knowledge at the
direction of a user, if specific statutory conditions are met). The scope of these provisions is still
not entirely clear, as courts are only beginning to struggle with the interpretation and
application of the complex provisions of § 512, and it is outside the scope of this Article. However,
to the extent that the safe harbor provisions of § 512 would be found to apply to a particular case,
they would likely provide protection from criminal liability as well as for civil liability. See id. §
512(c)(1) (restricting liability for service providers to limited forms of injunctive relief, and
referring generally to exemption from "monetary relief' for infringement without distinguishing
between criminal fines and civil damages).
95. Although those who aid and abet persons who directly infringe a copyright may also
be liable for criminal infringement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) ("Whoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal."), a discussion of potential criminal aiding and abetting
liability for secondary infringers is outside the scope of this Article. Although there are
interesting questions regarding whether secondary liability in the civil context might actually be
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In the context of civil copyright infringement litigation, the
courts have recognized two forms of secondary infringement:
contributory infringement and vicarious infringement.96 These two
theories of secondary liability differ in the required level of the
defendant's knowledge and participation in the infringing acts, and
thus lead to different considerations in evaluating whether secondary
liability can (or should) be imposed in the criminal context.
Contributory copyright infringement exists when a defendant, "with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another."97 In other words,
"liability exists if the defendant engages in 'personal conduct that
encourages or assists the infringement.' 9 The required state of mind
for contributory infringement is that the defendant "know or have
reason to know" of the direct infringement. 99 For a claim of vicarious
infringement to succeed, however, the plaintiff need not demonstrate
that the defendant had any knowledge of the infringing conduct, but
only that the "defendant 'has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities."'100  Thus, in contrast to contributory infringement,
vicarious infringement requires proof only of an ability to supervise
and a direct financial interest in the infringing conduct.
The courts have not yet directly addressed whether
contributory or vicarious infringement as developed in the context of
civil copyright infringement can satisfy the first element of a criminal
infringement case. 101 Every reported criminal copyright infringement
more difficult to prove than aiding and abetting in the criminal context, this Article leaves that
discussion for another day, largely because recent cases have cast doubt on whether aiders and
abetters are subject to civil RICO liability. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (rejecting civil aiding and abetting liability under securities fraud
statute because Congress did not expressly provide for civil liability for aiders and abettors); Pa.
Ass'n of Edwards Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 844 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying Central Bank
decision to affirm summary judgment for defendant on grounds that civil RICO liability could
not be imposed for aiding and abetting in RICO violations).
96. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417-18 (1984).
97. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)); see also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-23 (2005).
98. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g
Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998)).
99. Id. at 1020 (quoting Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d
829, 845-46 n. 29 (11th Cir. 1990)).
100. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fonovisia, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
101. In United States v. Dove, 585 F. Supp. 2d 865 (W.D. Va. 2008), touted by the
Department of Justice as the "first-ever P2P trial conviction," the defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to commit criminal copyright infringement and criminal copyright infringement. PRO
IP, supra note 83, at 12. Although described as an administrator of the file-sharing group, Dove
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case has involved direct infringers (or persons found to have actively
conspired with or aided and abetted direct infringers); none involved a
theory based expressly on contributory or vicarious infringement. 10 2
Moreover, the Copyright Act "does not expressly render anyone
liable for infringement committed by another."103 While courts have
was also alleged in the Indictment (and presumably proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial) to
have uploaded pirated content to other members of the group and downloaded pirated content,
violating the distribution and reproduction rights of the copyright owners of the works.
Indictment, United States v. Dove, No. 2:07CR15 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2007). Thus, his conviction
on the count of criminal infringement was likely based upon proof of his acts of direct
infringement and not merely those of secondary infringement related to his administration of a
file-sharing service that facilitated direct infringement by others.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Armstead, 524 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008) (interpreting
meaning of "retail value" for purpose of felony conviction for selling bootleg DVDs); United States
v. Khalil, 132 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 1997) (defendant participated in large-scale criminal enterprise
that manufactured and distributed counterfeit audio tapes); United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d
222 (8th Cir. 1995) (involving defendant's participation in sale and modification of cloning
packages for decryption of satellite transmissions); United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672
(2d Cir. 1992) (convicting a defendant who operated video counterfeiting laboratory); United
States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1991) (convicting defendants of conspiracy to
distribute counterfeit tapes and labels); United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the defendant, who was the employee and live-in girlfriend of the owner of a video
store, was properly convicted of criminal infringement where she willfully participated in a
conspiracy to infringe even though she did not intend to personally profit from the conduct;
evidence showed she had instructed an undercover agent how to remove labels from original
videocassettes for transfer to unauthorized copies); United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.
1986) (addressing an aiding and abetting and conspiracy conviction for copying and selling
unauthorized videos of films); United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986) (convicting
defendant for selling counterfeit video games); United States v. Steele, 785 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.
1986) (convicting defendant who sold 20-25 unauthorized copies of films); United States v.
Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) (convicting defendant who assisted husband in
operating business that distributed unauthorized copies of pornographic films; evidence showed
she had full knowledge of and active participation in conspiracy); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d
1180 (9th Cir. 1977) (convicting defendant who operated business that sold copyrighted feature-
length motion pictures that had been licensed, not sold, by owners of films to third parties and
thus were not subject to first sale doctrine); United States v. Cassim, 693 F. Supp. 2d 697 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (deciding pre-trial motion in criminal prosecution of defendant charged with leading a
conspiracy to infringe copyright for private gain by copying and distributing musical recordings);
United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (convicting defendants who, without
consent of copyright owners, manufactured and sold eight-track stereo tape recordings).
103. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984). This is
still generally true, although the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's addition of § 512 to the
Copyright Act recognizes the fact that secondary infringers have been held responsible for civil
copyright infringement by providing certain "safe harbors" for specific types of secondary
infringers who facilitate the transmission of data over the Internet and recognizes liability for
those who seek to circumvent certain technological protections against copying that copyright
owners might place on their works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201 (2006). See generally Neil A. Benchell,
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Review of the Law and the Court's Interpretation, 2
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 30 (2003) (describing the DMCA's anti-circumvention and safe harbor
provisions and noting that the DMCA codifies existing case law regarding the liability of Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") for copyright infringement by customers of the ISPs, providing safe
harbors and limiting liability for ISPs); Francisco Castro, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
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recognized, in the context of civil liability, that "[t]he absence of such
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the
imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties
who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity," 10 4 they
have not addressed this issue in the context of criminal liability.
Because criminal statutes are subject to stricter interpretation than
statutes imposing civil liability,105 conduct that would constitute
infringement in a civil context might not suffice in a criminal context:
Federal crimes, of course, "are solely creatures of statute." Accordingly, when assessing
the reach of a federal criminal statute, we must pay close heed to language, legislative
history, and purpose in order strictly to determine the scope of the conduct the
enactment forbids. Due respect for the prerogatives of Congress in defining federal
crimes prompts restraint in this area, where we typically find a "narrow interpretation"
appropriate.106
The courts have traditionally held that, given a choice between
two readings of a federal crime, the harsher alternative should not be
chosen unless Congress has spoken in clear and definite language. 107
Thus, for example, in analyzing whether the National Stolen Property
Act provision imposing criminal penalties on the interstate
transportation of stolen property included interstate transportation of
"bootleg" recordings, the Dowling Court conducted an extensive review
of the legislative history of the criminal infringement provisions of the
Copyright Act:108
The history of copyright infringement provisions affords additional reason to hesitate
before extending [the National Stolen Property Act] to cover the interstate shipments in
this case. Not only has Congress chiefly relied upon an array of civil remedies to provide
copyright holders protection against infringement, but in exercising its power to render
criminal certain forms of copyright infringement, it has acted with exceeding caution.
1 0 9
Provisions on Circumventing Protection Systems and Limiting Liability of Service Providers, 3
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 3 (2004) (describing the limitations on liability relating to online
materials provided for in § 512 of the Copyright Act pursuant to the DMCA); Stephen M.
McJohn, Eldred's Aftermath: Tradition, the Copyright Clause, and the Constitutionalization of
Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 122 (2003) ('The anti-circumvention
provisions could arguably be characterized as adapting vicarious liability for the digital age, thus
remaining within the traditional contours of copyright law.").
104. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.
105. See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 408-09 (2003) (noting
that although RICO statute is given broad interpretation, predicate criminal statute was to be
strictly construed with ambiguities resolved in favor of lenity); Dowling v. United States, 473
U.S. 207, 213 (1985) (citing Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982)) (recognizing
that criminal statutes are to be construed more strictly than civil statutes).
106. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 213 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 214.
108. Id. at 218-25. Of course, this review did not include the amendments that Congress
has made to those sections since 1985, but it is nonetheless a useful indication of the Court's
interpretation of some of the language of the criminal copyright provisions.
109. Id. at 221.
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The Court also emphasized that the history "of the criminal
infringement provisions of the Copyright Act reveals a good deal of
care on Congress' part before subjecting copyright infringement to
serious criminal penalties.... This step-by-step, carefully considered
approach is consistent with Congress' traditional sensitivity to the
special concerns implicated by the copyright laws."110
The legislative history of the recent amendments that imposed
felony liability on certain infringers and increased the potential
sanctions against them suggests that Congress did not intend to
sweep traditional secondary infringers into the class of felony
offenders; rather, Congress was targeting "pirates"-infringers who
illegally copy protected works and sell them for a profit or who cause
significant losses to copyright owners even without profit.'
On the other hand, at least in the civil context, secondary
liability is well-established, and the full scope of civil remedies for
infringement is available against secondary infringers.112 Because the
criminal copyright statute refers simply to "any person who willfully
infringes a copyright," 113 courts may conclude that this language
applies equally to direct and secondary infringers, so long as the
infringement itself is "willful." If secondary infringers can meet the
infringement element of criminal copyright infringement, it might be
even easier for a prosecutor, or a plaintiff in a civil RICO case, to
succeed against such defendants on the remaining elements, because
the elements of willfulness or profit motive will have already been
established by meeting the requirements for secondary infringement,
as discussed in the following subsections.
2. Requirement of Willful Infringement
In many infringement cases, the willfulness requirement will
not add significantly to the plaintiffs burden of proof and should at
least create a sufficient issue of fact to survive dismissal or summary
judgment. The Copyright Act does not define "willful" in § 506(a), and
the legislative histories of the Copyright Felony Act and the No
Electronic Theft Act ("NET Act") indicate that Congress intended that
110. Id. at 225. The Dowling Court ultimately concluded that because Congress had not
clearly indicated that the National Stolen Property Act was meant to impose additional criminal
sanctions for interstate transportation of works that infringe upon copyrights, copyrighted works
were not a form of "property" covered by the Act. Id. at 229.
111. See supra note 68.
112. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 1019-23 (2005).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
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courts would define the term.114 Although the NET Act amended the
"willfulness" requirement to state that "evidence of reproduction or
distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to
establish willful infringement," 15 this language does not identify the
dividing line separating sufficient from insufficient evidence of
willfulness.
Courts have split over whether the requirement of "willful"
infringement includes an intent simply to engage in the acts that
constitute infringement or whether it is limited to a specific intent to
violate the copyright laws. Most recent criminal infringement cases to
address the issue, however, have concluded that prosecutors must
establish that the defendant knew that the conduct at issue violated
the copyright laws.116 The only reported decision to analyze this
conflict in any depth is United States v. Moran, a case that preceded
the NET Act amendment.117 The Moran court examined the use of the
word "willful" in the context of civil copyright infringement and
concluded that by using the term "willful," "Congress intended to
soften the impact of the common-law presumption that ignorance of
the law or mistake of the law is no defense to a criminal prosecution
by making specific intent to violate the law an element of federal
criminal copyright offenses."118 Moran thus held that "'willfully,' in 17
U.S.C. § 506(a), means a 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty."'119 The Moran court also concluded that this rule is
subjective; the test is whether the defendant truly believed that the
copyright laws did not prohibit his conduct. 120
114. See H.R. REP. No. 102-997, at 4-5 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569, 3573
(discussing purposes of amendments in Copyright Felony Act); H.R. REP. No. 105-339, at 3--5, 9-
10 (1997) (discussing purposes of amendments in NET Act and concern that providing express
definition of willfulness could place too many limitations on prosecutors).
115. No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
116. Compare United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
defendant must have engaged in infringing conduct with knowledge that his or her activity was
prohibited by law), and United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Neb. 1991) (quoting
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) ("'[W]illful' means voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty."), with United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943)
(suggesting, but not holding, that "willful" only means an intent to copy, not to infringe).
117. 757 F. Supp. at 1049.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991)).
120. Id. at 1051. The Ninth Circuit seems to have adopted, or at least employed, the
stricter test for "willfulness" in the context of the criminal copyright infringement statute. See
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 1977). In Wise, the Ninth Circuit did
not expressly address the ambiguity in the statutory requirement of "willful" infringement, but
implicitly adopted the stricter standard. See id. at 1186, 1194-95 (discussing at length the
defendant's actual knowledge of the absence of a first sale, of the illegality of selling film prints
containing copyright notices, and of the illegal acquisition of the film prints by his sources).
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The strict interpretation of the "willful" requirement adopted
by Moran has not been widely cited but is the "better view" 121 for a
number of reasons. First, it draws a more distinct line between civil1 22
and criminal copyright infringement, particularly given the ease of
establishing the "profit" requirement.123 Second, it may be acceptable,
in light of the harm to the copyright owner, to impose civil damages on
a defendant who intentionally copies but believes in good faith that
her conduct is permissible, but imposing criminal penalties on the
same defendant seems unfair without a bright line test for fair use
and given the stigma attached to a criminal conviction.124
However, because neither Congress nor the courts have yet
provided firm guidance on the state of mind requirement for criminal
infringement, the criminal copyright provision may reach beyond
those defendants who have a subjective intent to violate the Copyright
Act to ensnare those who have constructive, but not actual, knowledge
of the illegality of their conduct or who recklessly infringe. This group
would include those who download material from the Internet without
inquiring as to whether the work is copyrighted.
If secondary infringers can satisfy the infringement element of
§ 506(a), many contributory infringers likely meet the requirements
for willfulness under the criminal statute. Proof of contributory
liability would likely meet the "willful" element even under the strict
121. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 15.01[A][21, at 15-6 (citing Moran with approval
and stating that the "better view" is that willfulness requires the "voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty").
122. Civil copyright infringement is a strict liability offense; the mere act of copying is
sufficient for purposes of civil liability and the plaintiff need not establish that the defendant
intended to violate a copyright owner's rights. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283
U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d
Cir. 1963). The issue of willful infringement does arise in civil infringement cases in the context
of determining the amount of recoverable damages and attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Chi Boy Music v.
Charlie Club Inc., 930 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that willful infringement was
established in a civil case where club received letter informing it that its use of music was illegal
and evidence demonstrated knowledge of club owners of process for obtaining license for use of
copyrighted music); Canopy Music, Inc. v. Harbor Cities Broad., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Wis.
1997) (holding that a radio station that repeatedly played a song after several notices of
infringement engaged in willful infringement). Even in the context of determinations of
willfulness in civil cases, however, there is no clear indication from the courts as to the
applicable standard for determining the presence of willfulness. See generally Jeffrey M. Thomas,
Comment, Willful Copyright Infringement: In Search of a Standard, 65 WASH. U. L. REV. 903
(1990). In light of the No Electronic Theft Act's express provision that willfulness cannot be
established solely by evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work in criminal
cases, see 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006), the interpretation of the civil and criminal "willfulness"
provisions may very well diverge as courts continue to struggle with defining the scope of the
term.
123. See infra Part II.A.3.
124. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 15.01[A] [2], at 15-6.
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interpretation of the term. "Contributory liability requires that the
secondary infringer 'know or have reason to know' of direct
infringement."1 25 Some cases involving the Internet have suggested
that "evidence of actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement" is
required for contributory liability to attach. 126 If actual knowledge of
infringement is required to prove contributory liability, such proof
would likely satisfy the willfulness standard under § 506(a).
In contrast to contributory infringers, vicarious infringers will
seldom meet the willfulness requirement. Proof of vicarious liability
does not require knowledge of infringement. 127 Thus, for a vicarious
infringer to be criminally responsible, the plaintiff bears an additional
burden of proving willfulness. In the typical case of vicarious liability,
this element cannot be met; indeed, the typical vicarious infringer has
no knowledge of the infringement or intent to assist in it.128
In a claim against a typical direct infringer engaging in P2P
file sharing, the willfulness element likely can be established even
under the strict interpretation, particularly in a civil RICO case where
the burden is only preponderance of the evidence. 129 The music, film,
and software industries have launched a massive media campaign in
recent years to educate consumers about the fact that unauthorized
copying violates copyright law,130 which at least creates a jury
question as to whether an individual defendant knew that
downloading copyrighted files using P2P software services violated
copyright law. To the extent that file sharers are uploading legally
purchased copies of these works, subsequently distributed to others
without the copyright owners' permission, demonstrating that these
125. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
126. Id. at 1021; See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Serv., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
127. See Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("Unlike
contributory infringement, knowledge is not an element of vicarious liability.").
128. See supra note 99-100. In contrast, a plaintiff or prosecutor who is successful in
proving vicarious infringement will likely have no difficulty meeting the "profit" element of
criminal infringement. See infra Part III.A.3. Given the low threshold for demonstrating the
"profit" element of criminal infringement discussed below, a plaintiff who can establish the
requisite "direct financial interest" in an infringing activity for vicarious liability can probably
also establish that the infringement was for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain. See id.
129. See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1987); cf. Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (suggesting, but refusing to decide, that
preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate for elements of civil RICO claim).
130. See sources cited supra note 5. While these media campaigns have not been very
successful in changing social norms and reducing widespread illegal copying of protected works,
they have certainly been successful in terms of providing notice to the general public about the
illegality of such copying. See TWEENS AND TEENS, supra note 1 (summarizing results of 2004
survey of 1183 respondents, ages 8-18, showing that 86% of young people were aware that
software is copyrighted and 88% were aware that music and movies are copyrighted).
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works contained a copyright notice and warning will be relatively
simple.131 While defendants who can demonstrate a good faith, but
incorrect, belief that their conduct was permitted as a fair use may be
able to defeat the willfulness requirement, 132 plaintiffs likely can
create a sufficient disputed issue of material fact regarding the file-
sharing defendants' knowledge and intent to avoid summary judgment
in civil proceedings. 133
Thus, at least in many cases involving illegal downloading of
copyrighted works, and perhaps in some cases alleging secondary
infringement, the willfulness requirement does not add significantly to
the plaintiffs burden of proof and is unlikely to provide defendants
facing allegations of direct infringement an opportunity for dismissal
before trial.
3. The For Profit or Sufficient Value Requirement
To prove the third element of criminal infringement, the
prosecutor or plaintiff must show that the defendant infringed for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; that the
value of the rights infringed by reproduction or distribution exceeded
$1,000 in any 180-day period; or that the infringement constituted a
pre-release, online distribution of a work intended for commercial
distribution.13 4 The courts' application of this element suggests it
requires a very low threshold that can almost always be established,
in any case worth pursuing, where the elements of willful
infringement are present.135
First, the "commercial advantage or private financial gain"
element does not require an actual pecuniary gain; it is sufficient to
131. See, e.g., FBI and Recording Industry Unveil New Anti-Piracy Seal, RECORDING
INDUSTRY ASS'N OF AM. (Feb. 19, 2004), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?resultpage=
&id=83E36774-6725-F430-C8FO-7ABBE34E9060 (reporting on FBI and RIAA unveiling of
voluntary, government-sanctioned anti-piracy warning seal and warning that can be included on
various types of copyrighted music to warn the public of the illegality of copying and distributing
music without permission).
132. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
134. 17 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
135. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 15.01[A] [21, at 15-6 (noting that "almost all
civil cases that reach the stage of litigation arise in a for-profit posture"). Nimmer states that the
profit motive requirement for criminal infringement "does not meaningfully winnow down the
population of copyright defendants potentially liable to incarceration. Does this mean that every
run-of-the-mill copyright case can serve as the basis of an indictment, if only the United States
Attorney's attention can be secured? Certainly, that result lies far afield both from Congress'
intent, and from any rational ordering of the copyright system." Id.
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demonstrate "the hope of some pecuniary gain."136 Courts have found
that P2P sharing of copyrighted works is a commercial use even
though no money changes hands. 137 Thus, courts would likely deem
such conduct to be "for purposes of commercial advantage" within the
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). As the court stated in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., "[d]irect economic benefit is not required to
demonstrate a commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative
copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for
sale, may constitute a commercial use." 13 8 In finding file sharing a
commercial use, the court also specifically noted the language of the
NET Act, which defines a financially motivated transaction for
purposes of criminal copyright infringement to include trading
infringing copies of a work for other items, "including the receipt of
other copyrighted works."139 Thus, even if a defendant has simply
copied for personal use without permission or payment, such copying
probably satisfies the commercial purpose or private financial gain
prong.
Second, the "benefit" or "gain" contemplated by the statute
need not be personal to the defendant. As long as the defendant
participates in the infringing conduct and does so willfully, it suffices
that the activity is for the purpose of financial gain or benefit
regardless of whether the individual defendant stands to profit in any
way.140 Thus, where willfulness can be established, the burden of
proving commercial advantage or private financial gain is easily met,
even without reference to the statutory exceptions regarding
136. United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v.
Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1195 (9th
Cir. 1977); cf. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming
district court's finding that Napster users engaged in commercial use of copyrighted materials
because distribution to anonymous requester was not a personal use and "Napster users get for
free something they would ordinarily have to buy").
137. E.g., A&MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1015.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting the No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997));
see also Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that church that copied religious text for its members "unquestionably profit[ed]" from
the unauthorized distribution); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir.
1994) (concluding that for-profit research laboratory gained indirect economic advantage by
photocopying copyrighted scholarly articles); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding a commercial use when individuals downloaded copies of video games to
avoid having to buy them).
140. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a claim by
employee of video store that she could not be criminally responsible because she did not realize
any personal commercial advantage or private gain, because it suffices that the activity be for
the purpose of financial gain or benefit regardless of whether defendant actually realizes any
advantage or gain).
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infringements valued at more than one thousand dollars1 41 or pre-
release distribution of commercial works.142
The statutory exceptions to the commercial advantage or
private financial gain element permit criminal conviction even where
the defendant's infringing acts had no profit motive, as long as the
value of the rights infringed is sufficiently high or the unauthorized
distribution is sufficiently early. 143 With respect to the exception
dealing with the value of the infringed works, the statute specifies
that the value be measured by the "total retail value" of the infringing
copies.144 Even if sufficient proof is lacking of an indirect benefit (for
example, where the defendant has received nothing in exchange for
uploading copyrighted material), the exception based on value will
often be met in file-sharing cases. While it is unclear how the "retail
value" of infringed works will be determined in these cases,145 many
P2P file sharers (particularly active P2P users, like those the RIAA
targeted) download dozens of music files in any given week.146
Because the retail value is measured over a six-month period, even if
the retail value measure for an individual work is relatively low, very
active downloaders will likely surpass the statutory amount within six
months. 147 Those who download movies and software with any
141. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B) (2006).
142. Id. § 506(a)(1)(C).
143. See id. §§ 506(a)(1)(B), (C).
144. Id. § 506(a)(1)(B).
145. See Criminal Resource Manual § 1852 Copyright Infringement-Penalties-17
U.S.C. § 506(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foia reading room/usam/title9/crmOl852.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) ("It is not
entirely clear, however, what is meant by 'retail value' in this context, and courts have relied
upon a number of methods to achieve equitable results"); see also United States v. Armstead, 524
F.3d 442, 443 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that "retail value is determined by taking the highest of
the 'face value,' 'par value,' or 'market value' of copies of the copyrighted material in a retail
context"); United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing Sentencing
Guideline provision that infringing goods are to be valued at the normal retail price of
noninfringing items to consumers); United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir.
1991) (approving "market value" of counterfeit tapes as an appropriate measure of "retail value"
in criminal infringement case).
146. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of owners of sound recordings where individual defendant
undisputedly downloaded "more than 1,370 copyrighted songs during a few weeks"); 64
Individuals Agree To Settlements In Copyright Infringement Cases, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS'N
OF AM. (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?newsmonth filter=9&news year_
filter=2003&resultpage=&id=28F44ED2-AFO3-C3F1-1A40-F80C6F763A4F (indicating
settlements in suits against individual P2P file sharers who were "illegally distributing, on
average, more than 1,000 music files for millions of other peer-to-peer network users to copy for
free").
147. In the Gonzalez case, for example, the defendant was alleged to have downloaded
more than 1300 songs in a several-week period. 430 F.3d at 889. Even if "retail value" were
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regularity are even more likely to meet this element, regardless of any
personal profit motive, as these copyrighted works sell at a much
greater retail value than music files and are not as readily separated
into component parts that might have a lower retail value than the
work as a whole. 148 Thus, the final element of criminal infringement
is met even where the infringement is motivated only by indirect
financial benefit or where the copyright owner suffers only $1,000 in
lost value over a six-month period; further, while either of these
conditions would suffice, both are met in most civil infringement cases
worth litigating over.
The criminal copyright statute thus demands little additional
proof beyond that required of plaintiffs in many civil copyright
infringement cases. For civil RICO liability to attach, however, in
addition to proving the elements of criminal copyright infringement,
the plaintiff will also need to demonstrate that the criminal
infringements meet the requirements of RICO. As discussed in the
next Part, just as the criminal copyright statute places little
additional burden on many civil plaintiffs, proof of civil infringement
will, in many cases, likely satisfy the requirements of RICO-or at
least create sufficient ambiguity to survive outright dismissal.
B. Proving a RICO Claim in a Copyright Case
Since Congress added criminal copyright infringement as a
predicate offense under RICO in 1996, copyright plaintiffs have begun
to allege civil RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1964,
seeking treble damages and other remedies offered by the RICO
statute that are otherwise unavailable in a civil copyright suit.149 Like
civil RICO cases generally,15 0 few, if any, of these cases involve
traditional organized crime.
To date, only a small number of reported decisions have
interpreted the RICO statute in the context of copyright infringement
determined by the typical $.99 per song price for many Internet music stores-although many
songs are now offered for higher prices-an infringer like Gonzalez would readily meet the
statutory "for profit" requirement under the criminal infringement provision. See 17 U.S.C. §
506(a)(1)(B).
148. For example, new releases of DVDs typically retail for about $16.99 per copy at
online stores like Amazon.com, see New DVD Releases, AMAZON.COM, http://www.
amazon.com/dvds (follow "DVD" hyperlink under "Categories"; then follow "Last 30 days"
hyperlink under "New Releases") (last visited Aug. 9, 2010), and software can range from
discount prices for computer games at $6.99 per copy to hundreds of dollars for a copy of software
encompassing more complex applications, See, e.g., Business & Office Management Software,
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/software (follow "All Business and Office" hyperlink; then
follow "Business and Office Management Software" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
149. See supra note 85 and text accompanying note 16.
150. See infra note 272.
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claims, but under the general interpretation of RICO, at least some
infringement cases will easily qualify for RICO liability and others
will likely survive motions to dismiss. One of the first plaintiffs to
vigorously pursue RICO claims in a copyright infringement case was
Perfect 10, a company that has sued dozens of entities involved in the
Internet pornography business for the alleged unlicensed use of its
copyrighted photographs on a variety of commercial pornography
sites.15 1  Much of this litigation involved claims of secondary
infringement against entities that made access to the sites of the
direct infringers possible, such as billing, web screening, and credit
card companies. 152 In those cases where Perfect 10 pursued RICO
claims, the courts initially refrained from granting outright dismissals
of the RICO allegations at the pleading stage. 153 Like many of the civil
RICO cases brought in connection with commercial disputes between
business entities,154 the addition of civil RICO claims has added both a
151. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1127-28 (C.D.
Ca. 2001) (permitting RICO claims to go forward in copyright infringement suit against
"gatekeepers" of pornography websites alleged to have infringed copyrighted photographs of
plaintiff); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming
dismissal of secondary liability claims against defendants who continued to process payments for
websites that allegedly infringed plaintiffs intellectual property rights after being notified of
infringement); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
display of thumbnail images of copyright owner's photographs was a fair use, but concluding that
Amazon "substantially assisted" third party websites in distributing infringing copies of
photographs for purposes of contributory infringement claim).
152. See supra note 151.
153. See Perfect 10, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28 (permitting RICO claims to go
forward in copyright infringement suit against "gatekeepers" of pornography websites alleged to
have infringed copyrighted photographs of plaintiff); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp.
2d 1077, 1105-06 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (granting summary judgment on RICO claims because claims
were predicated entirely on claimed copyright infringement, and district court concluded that
DMCA safe harbors prevented defendants from copyright liability), affd in part and rev'd in
part, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing summary judgment
on copyright claims and remanding to district court for further determinations, finding that
additional findings were needed before safe harbors could be found to protect defendants from
copyright liability, and making no mention of disposition on appeal of RICO claims).
154. See generally Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-500 (1985)
(recognizing that the vast majority of civil RICO claims were asserted against businesses in
commercial disputes rather than against organized crime figures but, nonetheless, construing
the language of the RICO statute broadly to encompass such disputes). In the two decades
following enactment of the RICO statute, some of the statute's strongest criticisms resulted from
successful attempts to apply the civil RICO statute to what were considered to be ordinary,
commercial disputes involving legitimate businesses. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 85 at 1-2
(statement of Rep. Hughes) (noting "growing concern about the increased use of the RICO
statute in many areas of civil commercial fraud which appears to be far afield of the conduct
Congress was considering when the RICO Act was enacted"); G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A.
Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals
for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851 (1990); Gerard E.
Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661 (1987).
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layer of complexity (because of the need to interpret the RICO statute
in the context of copyright infringement) and a heightened monetary
risk (due to the threat of treble damages on top of existing copyright
remedies) to what would otherwise be a traditional copyright
infringement suit.
Liability under any subsection of RICO's substantive provision
requires proof of an "enterprise" and "racketeering activity" that
occurs in a "pattern."155 Although the statute defines these terms,
their scope and meaning have been heavily litigated.156 Despite the
large number of reported decisions interpreting and applying these
terms, ambiguities remain with respect to the nature and scope of
activity that will be sufficient to qualify for RICO penalties, making it
difficult for defendants facing civil RICO claims to evaluate their risk
of liability and thus creating an incentive to settle rather than to fully
litigate the claims to better define the boundaries of liability.15 7 As
discussed in the following sections, the file-sharing hypothetical could
meet, or at least create a jury question as to, the enterprise,
racketeering activity, and pattern requirements of the RICO statute,
as well as the additional elements of proof in §§ 1962(c) or (d) and the
standing requirement of § 1964(c).15 8
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2010).
156. As Pamela Bucy has noted, "Key to all [four types of RICO claims] are three
concepts: 'racketeering activity' (any of the felony offenses listed in the statute); a 'pattern' of
racketeering activity (at least two 'closely related' racketeering activities that demonstrate
'continuity' and are committed within a ten-year time period); and 'enterprise' (any entity or
group of individuals 'associated in fact' that affects interstate or foreign commerce). Twenty-five
[now more than thirty] years of jurisprudence in thousands of court opinions have been devoted
to delineating these three concepts." Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20
(2002).
157. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the broad
application of civil RICO liability and noting that "[m]any a prudent defendant, facing ruinous
exposure, will decide to settle even a case with no merit"); A. Darby Dickerson, Curtailing Civil
RICO's Long Reach: Establishing New Boundaries for Venue and Personal Jurisdiction Under 18
U.S.C. 1965, 75 NEB. L. REV. 476, 490 n. 75 (1996); Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of
Losses in the Securities Markets: The Role of Civil Rico in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 896, 900 n. 19 (1990).
158. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1962(d), 1964(c) and discussion below. The same is
arguably true for many other more "traditional" copyright infringement suits where willful
infringement can be established, particularly those cases in which infringement of multiple
works or multiple protected rights in a work is alleged or multiple defendants are involved, such
as where works alleged to violate copyright law have been widely or repeatedly distributed
through multiple channels. In addition, those copyright infringement actions that justify
injunctive relief under 17 U.S.C. § 502 are likely to also satisfy the RICO requirements, as
typically injunctions are justified where there is a threat of continuing infringement that is likely
to cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff.
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1. Enterprise
According to § 1961(4), "'enterprise' includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."15 9 At least for purposes of liability under the most commonly
used prong of the RICO statute, a single individual or entity cannot be
both an "enterprise" and an individual defendant,160 although two
business entities can form an "enterprise" and still be named as
individual defendants.161
In United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court recognized the
broad remedial purposes of RICO and held that "enterprise"
encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. 162 Turkette
essentially established a multi-pronged test to establish an
"enterprise": (1) evidence of a "common purpose"; (2) evidence of an
"ongoing organization, formal or informal"; and (3) evidence that the
various associates "function as a continuing unit."163
The Court elaborated on the second prong of this test in Boyle
v. United States,164 after courts had split on whether and to what
extent a RICO plaintiff must prove an organizational "structure" for
an associated-in-fact enterprise.165 The Court concluded that while
some structure is required, no "formal" hierarchical or managerial
structure to the organization need be proved: "[A]n association-in-fact
enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose,
relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
160. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001) ("[T]o establish
liability under § 1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a
'person'; and (2) an 'enterprise' that is not simply the same 'person' referred to by a different
name."); see also Kehr Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1991); Rae v.
Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984).
161. River City Mkts, Inc. v. Fleming Foods W., Inc., 960 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992).
162. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
163. Id. at 583; see also Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 550-51 (9th Cir. 2007).
164. 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244-45 (2009).
165. For some time, a number of courts interpreted the Supreme Court's statement in
Turkette that an enterprise must be "separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it
engages," 452 U.S. at 583, as requiring that an associated-in-fact enterprise have a business-like
structure distinct from the pattern of racketeering, but other courts concluded that "an
associated-in-fact enterprise under RICO does not require any particular organizational
structure, separate or otherwise." Odom, 486 F.3d at 550-51 (discussing the split in the circuits
and concluding that no particular organizational structure is required to prove an associated-in-
fact enterprise, but recognizing that other circuits require such a showing). In Boyle, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether a RICO enterprise must
have "an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in
which it engages." 129 S. Ct. at 2244.
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longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the
enterprise's purpose."166 Relying on dictionary definitions, the Court
also stated, "[tihe concept of 'associat[ion]' requires both interpersonal
relationships and a common interest."167  In reaching these
conclusions, the Court emphasized that the statutory definition of
"enterprise" is "obviously broad" and that "the very concept of an
association in fact is expansive," noting that the RICO statute
provides that its terms be "liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes." 168
Many traditional civil copyright infringement cases will likely
meet the enterprise requirement simply because most infringement
suits arise out of the alleged copying and widespread public
distribution of a protected work, which almost invariably involves a
series of participants, many of whom are corporations, who interact in
an organized way for a common purpose over a period of time. 169 In
the hypothetical involving college students sharing music over a P2P
network, for example, the enterprise requirement could be met by the
"organization" created by the software itself. The software creates an
organization comprised of the users who have downloaded the
software, which works by identifying which users are logged onto the
Internet and commandeering their computers to operate search
functions when other users request material. 170 The users share a
166. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2243.
169. For example, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), John Fogerty, former
lead singer and songwriter for the band Credence Clearwater Revival, was sued by his old record
label for allegedly copying his own song when he distributed an album through his new record
label. The defendants included not only Fogerty, but also Warner Records and other entities
involved in the distribution of the alleged infringing work. Id. at 519, n.3. While the plaintiff in
that case failed to establish even civil infringement, had civil RICO claims been available and
included in the suit, it is likely that the organized system of distribution for the allegedly
infringing song, which included entities responsible for manufacturing records and album covers,
national and international distributors, and retailers, all acting at the direction of and through
contractual arrangements with the record label, would provide sufficient structure to meet the
enterprise requirement. See Odom, 486 F.3d at 552-53 (concluding that defendants Best Buy
and Microsoft were adequately alleged to have engaged in an enterprise-in-fact by having the
common purpose of increasing users of Microsoft's Internet service; by establishing mechanisms,
which were employed for more than two years, for exchanging information about customers'
personal and financial information; and by entering into a cross-marketing contract for
promoting one another's businesses).
170. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-27 (2005)
(discussing the operation of Morpheus and Grokster peer-to-peer file-sharing software
platforms); Disney Enters., Inc. v. Delane, 446 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404 n. 3 (D. Md. 2006)
(explaining functioning of BitTorrent system); Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for
Copyright Infringement: BitTorrent as a Vehicle for Establishing a New Copyright Definition for
Staple Articles of Commerce, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 17-24 (2006) (describing operation
of BitTorrent system as compared to earlier P2P systems such as Napster and Grokster).
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common purpose-exchanging computer files; absent such a purpose,
they would not need to download the software, and downloading the
software requires a purposeful act. The various users "function as a
continuing unit" to the extent that they continue to use the software
or even simply leave the software on their computers and continue to
access the Internet, because once P2P software is downloaded it
typically remains running in the background and allows other users to
access files whenever the computer is connected to the Internet. 171
The more difficult component of the "enterprise" requirement
in the P2P context would be to prove "relationships among those
associated with the enterprise,"17 2 but even this component is likely
satisfied for those P2P users who download many unauthorized copies
of sound recordings and films. Even though not all of the software
users are necessarily participating in the activity of the organization
at any one time, the enterprise requirement can be met even where
some members of the organization are only involved in a piece of the
organization's activity and even where they have never met other
members of the enterprise.173 Just as participants in a traditional
RICO enterprise need not participate in all aspects of the enterprise
and can continue to operate the criminal enterprise even after a leader
is arrested, 174 P2P users will drop in and out of the network of users
171. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; cf. Stuller, supra note 18, at 538-39
(arguing that the organizational structure of P2P file sharing services like Kazaa is likely to
meet the enterprise requirement, but relying on the terms of the end user license agreement and
the organization of the system's supernodes).
172. Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009).
173. Id. at 2245-46. The Court stated that "[A]n association-in-fact enterprise is simply a
continuing unit that functions with a common purpose. . . . Members of the group need not have
fixed roles; different members may perform different roles at different times." Id. In fact,
"nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts of activity
punctuated by periods of quiescence. Nor is the statute limited to groups whose crimes are
sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique." Id.; see also Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F.
Supp. 2d 674, 692 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (concluding that, because plaintiff alleged that defendant
associated itself with another defendant, enterprise was adequately pleaded even though
defendant had no contact with two other alleged members of the enterprise). In the P2P file
sharing example, all of the "associates" at least have associated themselves with the person or
entity offering the software for download, even if the identities of the other associates are
personally unknown to them. Moreover, even if associates are anonymous-i.e., they do not
introduce themselves to one another or use their legal names-that fact should not preclude a
finding of an association-in-fact enterprise if they are in fact operating in a coordinated fashion
as a part of the enterprise. See, e.g., Bridgetree, Inc. v. Red F. Mktg. LLC, No. 3:10-cv-228-FDW-
DSC, 2010 WL 3081372, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss RICO claims,
finding sufficient allegations of an enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity where
associates in alleged enterprise communicated by private "Gmail" account and "anonymous"
teleconference, agreeing to use first names only, and only some members met in person to
discuss plan).
174. See, e.g., Odom, 486 F.3d at 552-53. See generally Lynch, supra note 154.
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established by the software, but the software creates an enterprise
that will continue to function even if the entity that launched the
software ceases to exist or some-but not all-users disable it.175
Moreover, the enterprise itself may be a legitimate
organization.17 6 The statute only requires that the RICO defendant be
associated with the enterprise and "conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity." 177 Thus, that P2P software can be (and in
fact is) used for legitimate purposes 78 does not preclude a finding that
it creates an "enterprise" by associating, through computer networks,
all its users and providing a vehicle for some of them to engage in
continuing copyright infringement by exchanging copyrighted works
without the owners' permission.
Of course, users of file-sharing programs could argue that they
act autonomously, in a way not sufficiently systematic to satisfy the
enterprise requirement. 179 Because of the vast number of P2P users,
an individual user could upload or download files for years without
ever exchanging illegal files with most of the other alleged members of
the enterprise, and without knowing from whom she obtained any
particular file or whether anyone had copied files that she uploaded.
Relying on Boyle, which described the concept of "association" as
requiring "interpersonal relationships," 18 0  the file sharer might
contend that transferring files is automated and involves no
"interpersonal" contact between users. However, given the Court's
repeated statements that RICO warrants broad construction' 8' and
the fact that no "interpersonal relationship" limitation appears in the
RICO statute itself, courts are likely to reject these arguments. At the
very least, the likelihood of success of these arguments is so uncertain
that they provide little comfort to defendants facing potential civil
RICO liability.
175. Peer-to-peer file sharing software also creates an entity distinct from the
"racketeering activity" itself, as it is capable of both legitimate and illegitimate purposes and, as
was conceded in Grokster, is not used exclusively for infringing copyrighted works. Grokster, 545
U.S. at 922-23. Even if it were used exclusively for infringement, however, the software could
still create an enterprise for purposes of RICO liability. See Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
176. E.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (stating that § 1962 applies
to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2010).
178. See supra notes 14, 175.
179. See, e.g., Elsevier, Inc. v. W.H.P.R., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 297, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(stating that an association-in-fact enterprise requires proof of more than simply individuals
engaging in the same type of illicit conduct during the same time period).
180. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244.
181. See, e.g., id. at 2243.
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The interpretation of the "enterprise" requirement in the P2P
context may depend on whether courts view the situation from the
perspective of the individual user who logs in and out for various
purposes unrelated to the functioning of the P2P network or from the
more global perspective of the network itself. RICO jurisprudence to
date has not extended the concept of enterprise to cover the activity of
millions of people whose only relationship is their common use of a
readily-accessible software program. However, P2P file sharing
software does create an organized structure through which millions of
copyrighted works are illegally exchanged, and those who use the
software in this way are participating in the conduct of the
enterprise-the sharing of files with other users-and taking
advantage of the association of interconnected computer databases of
copyrighted works that the membership of so many users creates.
Both the structure created by the P2P software itself and the
involvement of organizations that developed the particular P2P
software in administering and maintaining their services thus make it
at least feasible for the "enterprise" requirement to be met against
P2P users accused of engaging in repeated copyright infringement.
2. Racketeering Activity
Proof of establishing RICO liability also requires proof that the
defendant engaged in "racketeering activity," which includes, under §
1961(1)(B), "criminal infringement of a copyright." 182 Acts of criminal
copyright infringement that qualify for RICO liability include both
misdemeanors and felony offenses. 183 For example, a P2P file sharer
who did not download a sufficient number of works within a 180-day
period for felony liability to attach, but who engaged in a pattern of
infringement through repeated downloading, could be liable as a
racketeer even if she could only be convicted of a misdemeanor for the
underlying offenses. Moreover, while the harshest criminal sanctions
under the Copyright Act are limited to infringements of reproduction
or distribution rights, 184 the broad inclusion of all offenses under §
2319 in the list of RICO predicate acts sweeps infringements of all of
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B).
183. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319(b)(3), (c)(3) (2001).
184. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319. As Nimmer has noted, "[Ljarge-scale
commercial pirates of sound recordings and motion pictures usually infringe either or both of
these rights, but not the other rights under the copyright." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39 at
§ 15.01[B][1].
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the "bundle of rights" included in copyright into the realm of potential
RICO liability. 185
In addition, a defendant need not be convicted of the
underlying predicate offenses for a civil RICO action to proceed.1 86 In
fact, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested, albeit in dicta, that
proof of the underlying criminal offense need not be established
beyond a reasonable doubt in civil RICO proceedings.187 The circuit
courts have adopted the dicta in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. and
concluded that "the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to
proof of predicate acts in civil RICO litigation." 188 Thus, even those
who could not be convicted of criminal copyright infringement (for
example, because of conflicting evidence or the possible application of
one or more defenses to infringement that create "reasonable doubt")
could be found liable for treble damages in a civil RICO case arising
out of the same conduct.
3. Pattern
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), "pattern of racketeering activity"
means "at least two acts of racketeering activity," the last two of which
occurred within ten years of each other."189 A "pattern" requires more
than just commission of the requisite number of predicate acts.190 To
prove a "pattern of racketeering activity," the plaintiff must show that
"the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or
pose a threat of continued criminal activity."191  Both of these
requirements will typically be met in the context of copyright
infringement.
First, the "relationship" element of the "pattern" requirement
demands proof that the predicate acts have "'the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are
185. In addition to the reproduction and distribution rights granted to owners of
copyrights, the Copyright Act also includes adaptation, performance, and display rights in the
owners' "bundle of rights." 17 U.S.C. § 106.
186. 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985); see also Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 61
(1989) (holding same with respect to criminal prosecution under state RICO statute).
187. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 ("We are not at all convinced that the predicate acts must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a proceeding under § 1964( c).... But we need not
decide the standard of proof issue today.").
188. E.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir.
1987).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2010).
190. H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989).
191. Id. at 239.
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not isolated events."1 9 2 Second, the "continuity" element may be met
by either proof of a series of related predicate acts "extending over a
substantial period of time" or proof of a threat of continued
racketeering activity.193 Thus, "'[c]ontinuity' is both a closed- and
open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated
conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future
with a threat of repetition."1 94  For "closed-ended" continuity,
"[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and
threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this
requirement." 19 5 For "open-ended" continuity, whether a threat of
continued racketeering activity exists will depend on the specific facts
of each case, and it may be established "by showing that the predicate
acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing
business."196
Both the "relatedness" and "continuity" requirements of the
pattern element would likely be established in the file-sharing
hypothetical. The typical illegal file sharer does not limit herself to
only one copy of one copyrighted work,197 but instead uploads and
downloads multiple works through identical methods and for similar,
if not identical, purposes over an extended period of time. Plaintiffs
could probably establish this element in many copyright infringement
cases, which typically involve multiple infringements of multiple
rights even where a single copyrighted work is at issue.198 In addition,
192. Id. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), now partially repealed, which provided for
enhanced sentences for defendants who committed a felony as part of a pattern of criminal
conduct).
193. Id. at 242,
194. Id. at 241.
195. Id. at 242.
196. Id. In H.J., Inc., the acts of bribery that were alleged to form the pattern of
racketeering activity were claimed to be related by the common purpose of influencing
commissioners to win approval of unfair rates for the defendant and were alleged to have taken
place frequently over a six-year period. The Court held that these allegations satisfied the
relatedness requirement and were likely to satisfy the continuity requirement for the "pattern"
element. Alternatively, the Court held that the allegations sufficiently indicated that the alleged
bribes were part of the defendant's way of conducting its ongoing business, and thus reversed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs RICO claims. Id.
197. Any such "one time" infringers would be unlikely targets for litigation, even if the
other elements of a RICO claim could be established, as the measure of damages would be low
even if statutory damages were elected under the Copyright Act and treble damages then
imposed under the RICO Act.
198. There is some debate even in the civil context with respect to the treatment of
multiple infringements of a single work for purposes of calculating statutory damages. See
generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 14.04[E] (2004). However, it is conceivable that
a defendant who willfully infringed both the reproduction and the distribution right in a
particular copyrighted work could be found to have committed two separate crimes. Cf. Harris v.
Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing a separate statutory damage
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many copyright defendants are large corporations involved in the
distribution of entertainment products that infringement suits often
target, potentially enabling plaintiffs to rely on past findings of
infringement to support the pattern requirement. 199
4. Proof of Liability under § 1962(c) or (d)
The only remaining burden on the plaintiff in a civil RICO case
based on copyright infringement is establishing that the plaintiff
suffered a business or property injury under one of the four categories
of prohibited conduct under the RICO statute, all of which require
proof of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity.2 00 Of the
four subsections that define prohibited conduct, far more civil and
criminal cases implicate § 1962(c) than all of the other subsections
combined, largely because of its broad scope and the limitations that
award for each infringement of a copyrighted work); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Rheingold,
209 U.S.P.Q. 317 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (same). Those crimes would clearly meet the relatedness test in
light of the identity of the victim and of the purpose of the infringement. Moreover, the plaintiff
need not be the victim of each racketeering act that forms the "pattern." See Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2001). It would thus be possible
for this element to be met by proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had
committed criminal infringement in the past through similar methods. This avenue for
establishing the pattern element would open defendants up to relitigation of past infringement
claims, whether meritorious or not, that had been settled to avoid litigation costs or the
possibility of an adverse ruling. As many copyright defendants are large corporations involved in
the distribution of multiple copyrighted works, See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
524 (1994) (noting that copyright defendants "run the gamut from corporate behemoths to
starving artists"), they can be frequent targets for infringement claims. In these situations,
plaintiffs seeking to establish a "pattern" of infringement would be entitled to investigate past
allegations of copyright infringement by the defendants, which would be likely to greatly
increase the settlement value of infringement cases in which RICO claims are asserted. See
generally Lynch, supra note 154.
199. See supra note 198 (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524). Of course, if the alleged
infringement is an isolated event-involving a first-time infringement defendant, implicating
only one of the bundle of protected rights in a copyrighted work, and extending over only a brief
period of time-then it will not meet the "pattern" requirement. See Durning v. Citibank, Int'l,
990 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that sporadic or isolated predicate acts will not be
sufficient to form a "pattern"). In Durning, the court found no pattern of racketeering activity
even though there may have been numerous predicate acts and more than one victim was
involved, as all of the predicate acts "arose from a single, isolated event: the distribution of the
misleading Official Statement." Id. at 1139; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971
F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding no pattern because continuity requirement was not met
where defendants' activity took place over only six months, and where it served only one goal,
prosecution of a state tort suit, and there was no threat of any activity continuing beyond
conclusion of lawsuit). But see Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1528 (9th Cir. 1995)
(predicate acts occurring over thirteen months demonstrate sufficient period of time to satisfy
continuity requirement, and open-ended continuity was also shown where extorting kickbacks
had become defendants' regular way of doing business).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
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courts have read into the remaining provisions. 201 However, recent
precedent limiting the scope of this section to those defendants who
exercise some level of control over the "enterprise"202 may prevent
RICO from reaching at least some of the hypothetical situations
discussed in this Article.
Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for "any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity."203 The elements of a §
1962(c) claim require proof of "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity."204 While this section
would not apply where an employee of a legitimate enterprise happens
to commit racketeering acts unrelated to the business while on the its
premises,205 courts are split as to how close the relationship must be
between the business of the enterprise and the racketeering acts,206
and the most recent Supreme Court decision on point left many issues
unresolved. 207  Thus, the primary questions that remain most
201. See, e.g., Emmette F. Hale, III, Civil RICO and Intellectual Property After Sedima,
56 MIss. L.J. 567, 594 (1986) (noting that most civil RICO actions are brought under § 1962(c)
and that §§ 1962(a) and (b) are "rarely used in civil RICO cases"). For example, the application of
§ 1962(a) has been limited by the courts' requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that it
suffered injury specifically from the use or investment of income in the named enterprise in
order to succeed on a § 1962(a) claim. See, e.g., Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d
1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d
429, 437 (9th Cir. 1992)); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir.
1991). Because the first two subsections are unlikely to apply to copyright infringement actions,
the focus of this analysis will be on the potential application of subsections (c) and (d).
202. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184 (1993).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
204. Sun Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1987); Sedima,
S.P.R.I. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1983). In Cauble, the court held: "A defendant does not
'conduct' or 'participate in the conduct' of a lawful enterprise's affairs, unless (1) the defendant
has in fact committed the racketeering acts as alleged; (2) the defendant's position in the
enterprise facilitated his commission of the racketeering acts, and (3) the predicate acts had
some effect on the lawful enterprise." 706 F.2d at 1332-33.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990-91 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding
that the government did not need to prove a benefit to the enterprise from the racketeering
activity); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that § 1962(c)
requires that the defendant's position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over its
affairs enables the commission of the predicate acts and the predicate acts are related to the
activities of the enterprise).
207. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993). In Reves, the Court resolved the split
among the circuits with respect to whether the "conduct or participate" language of the statute
required participation in the enterprise at a managerial level in the affirmative, at least where
company outsiders are named as defendants, finding that § 1962(c) requires that the defendant
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ambiguous under § 1962(c) are how close the relationship must be
between the "affairs" of the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering
activity and what level of control over the enterprise is required for a
defendant to "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the
conduct of' an enterprise's affairs.208
In spite of these ambiguities, many typical copyright
infringement cases, including P2P file sharing cases, may meet the
nexus and participation requirements or will at least survive
summary judgment motions. Users of P2P services who upload and
download works without the owners' permission are involved in the
reproduction and distribution of illegal copies of copyrighted works
and thus satisfy the required nexus between their acts of copying and
distributing the works and the enterprise that facilitates the
infringement. Moreover, if the test for participation articulated by the
First Circuit is applied and those who are "integral to carrying out"
the illegal activities meet the participation requirement,209 many civil
copyright infringement defendants are likely to satisfy this element.
In the P2P context, in particular, where the enterprise comprises
many associates who use the enterprise to facilitate infringement, the
defendants in civil RICO cases will have taken an active and direct
role in facilitating infringement. By using P2P software to locate and
copy works, each user could be said to be "directing" the affairs of the
enterprise for unlawful purposes, because each of the users has the
ability to exercise such control. 210
have played some "integral" part in directing the affairs of the enterprise. Id. at 179. However,
the Court did not resolve the question of how high in the managerial hierarchy of the enterprise
a defendant must be in order to satisfy § 1962(c), stating in dicta that liability could extend to
"lower-rung participants" under the direction of management. Id. at 184.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that
Reves did not require proof of a managerial role in the enterprise and that jury could reasonably
have found that defendant member of motorcycle club had "some part" in directing affairs of
enterprise); United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 750-51 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that § 1962(c)
liability may be imposed against "lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the
direction of upper management" because they were "plainly integral to carrying out the collection
process," and that "Congress intended to reach all who participate in the conduct of [the]
enterprise, whether they be generals or foot soldiers").
209. Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750.
210. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning and
approach in Boyle v. United States, in which the Court emphasized that an association-in-fact
enterprise "need not have a hierarchical structure or a 'chain of command."' 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2245
(2009). If an enterprise need not have a hierarchical structure or chain of command, then it
follows that an associate in such a non-hierarchical enterprise may "conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs," 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), without
holding some sort of managerial or directorial role in the enterprise, so long as that associate's
actions further the pattern of racketeering activity and are closely enough connected to the
enterprise itself. See generally G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst
& Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy
Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345 (1996).
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Section 1962(d) may also allow the imposition of RICO liability
on non-managerial participants in the enterprise who can be shown to
have agreed to the racketeering activity. Subsection (d) imposes RICO
liability upon those who conspire to violate any of the other three
subsections of § 1962.211 Although the Supreme Court has recently
limited the scope of liability under subsection (d),212 it remains broad
enough to sweep many forms of direct (and perhaps contributory)
infringement into the RICO net.
In most jurisdictions, simply entering into an agreement to
violate the substantive provisions of RICO can subject a defendant to
liability under § 1962(d)213:
[T]he requirements for RICO's conspiracy charges under § 1962(d) are less demanding
[than for subsection (c) liability]: A 'conspirator must intend to further an endeavor
which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense,
but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.'
In the civil context, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant 'knew about and agreed to
facilitate the scheme.'
2 14
Defendants accused of conspiracy need not have agreed to
personally commit any of the predicate acts of racketeering, nor do
they need to have actually participated in the conduct of an
enterprise's affairs through the pattern of racketeering activity.
Instead, they need only have agreed to the scheme that creates
substantive RICO liability under one of the other subsections of §
1962.215 "A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree
to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive
offense."2 16 Moreover, "[tlhe conspiratorial agreement need not be
express so long as its existence can plausibly be inferred from the
defendants' words and actions and the interdependence of activities
211. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2010)
212. Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 505-06 (2000) (interpreting § 1962(d) in the context of
civil RICO liability to require an injury to the plaintiff caused by an overt act by the defendant
that is "independently wrongful under RICO").
213. See, e.g., Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 376-77 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that while a
defendant is only liable under § 1962(c) if he has discretionary authority in carrying out
directions from principals or plays a part in directing the affairs of the enterprise, conspirator
liability under § 1962(d) only requires that the defendant know about and agree to facilitate the
scheme).
214. Id. (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65, 66 (1997)).
215. See, e.g., Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63-66; Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d
580, 598, 600-01 (7th Cir. 2001); Goren v. New Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1998);
Handeen v. LeMaire, 112 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1997); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P&B Autobody, 43
F.3d 1546, 1561-63 (1st Cir. 1994).
216. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63.
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and persons involved."217 Thus, if a RICO violation can be established
under § 1962(a), (b), or (c), a defendant who engages in an overt
racketeering act that injures the plaintiff may be found liable as a
conspirator under § 1962(d) so long as circumstantial evidence
demonstrates a tacit agreement by the defendant to facilitate the
criminal endeavor. 218
The breadth of the conspiracy component of RICO could be
staggering if applied as liberally in the copyright infringement cases
as in other contexts. 219  Given the unresolved ambiguities in
interpreting § 1962(c), individual users of P2P file-sharing software
might not exercise sufficient "managerial" control over, or direct
enough participation in, the affairs of the enterprise to be found liable
under § 1962(c). Nonetheless, many cases may present sufficient
circumstantial evidence of a tacit understanding among users of the
P2P network that they are participating in an illegal enterprise for
plaintiffs to prove P2P users to be conspirators under § 1962(d), or at
least to create a jury question.220 The users of P2P networks arguably
participate indirectly, if not directly, in the conduct of the enterprise
established by the P2P software. Those who set up private P2P
networks, like the defendants in the first four RIAA lawsuits against
P2P users in 2003,221 should readily meet this test, as well as the
Reves standard for conducting, or participating in the conduct of, the
affairs of the enterprise for § 1962(c) liability. In addition, secondary
infringers, like those shown to have sufficient knowledge and control
over the actions of direct infringers in Napster and Grokster,222 could
217. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 241-42 (1st Cir.1990); see also Handeen, 112
F.3d at 1355 (stating that proof of conspiracy can be entirely based on circumstantial evidence
and plaintiffs need only establish a "tacit understanding").
218. See Beck, 529 U.S. at 505-06.
219. See, e.g., Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2001) (allowing civil RICO § 1962(d)
action to go forward against title companies and mortgage brokers who were alleged to have
conspired with a developer to mislead homeowners into buying homes they could not afford);
Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 43 F.3d at 1562 (affirming jury verdict against defendants under § 1962(d)
in case involving fraudulent insurance claims submitted through several auto body shops
because "the jury reasonably could have found that, although each defendant may not have
known the entire sweep of the conspiracy, each defendant knew that he or she was a part of a
larger fraudulent scheme").
220. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64 ("If conspirators have a plan which calls for some
conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty
as the perpetrators . . . so long as they share a common purpose, conspirators are liable for the
acts of their co-conspirators."); Stuller, supra note 18, at 544-45 (discussing likelihood that
secondary copyright infringers like the P2P service providers could be found liable for conspiracy
to violate RICO based on general knowledge of use of the service to violate copyright laws).
221. See supra note 7.
222. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
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also face RICO liability under either § 1962(c) or (d), assuming they
run the enterprise's operations and facilitate their users' participation
in the enterprise, particularly if they also meet the Grokster test for
"inducement" of infringement. 22 3 At the very least, the potential for
many copyright infringement plaintiffs to prove this element of a civil
RICO claim ought to give defendants pause when thinking about their
potential liability for treble damages, in addition to any award for the
infringement itself.
5. Standing under § 1964(c)
Once an enterprise, pattern of racketeering activity, and the
requirements of one of the subsections of § 1962 are established, the
final component of a civil RICO claim requires a plaintiff to show
injury to her "business or property by reason of a violation of §
1962."224 Thus, the harm to the plaintiff must flow directly from the
pattern of racketeering activity and fall within the "class of risks" that
Congress intended the RICO statute to prevent. 225 Although no bright
line test defines the nature and degree of causation required for civil
liability under § 1964(c),226 in the context of copyright infringement, a
very direct relationship between a pattern of racketeering activity
(infringing conduct) and harm to the plaintiff copyright owners exists.
The harm typically manifests itself in terms of lost profits or loss in
market value suffered by the copyright owners from unauthorized
copying and distribution of their works, and an award of actual
damages for civil copyright infringement requires proof of a causal
connection between the infringement and the lost revenues. 227
223. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 1019-23.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
225. See Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 375 (2d Cir. 2003). The court stated in Baisch
that "[w]here a racketeering enterprise intends no specific harms to any particular individual,
but causes harm by the creation of substantial risk of harm, the victim injured by that
enterprise's harm may have RICO standing ..... Id. at 376.
226. E.g., Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-68 (1992) (holding that
proximate cause is required, not simply "but for" causation, under § 1964(c), but that there is no
bright line rule); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) ("Proximate cause . .
. is a flexible concept that does not lend itself to 'a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in
every case."') (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n. 20).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006); see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 472
U.S. 539, 567 (1985) (stating that when causal connection is established between infringement
and loss of revenue, award of damages is appropriate unless defendant can meet burden of
showing that lost revenue would have occurred even without the infringement); Montgomery v.
Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that proof of actual damages requires
causal connection between defendant's infringement and injury to market value of plaintiffs
work).
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Congress has repeatedly recognized that copying without
authorization or justification establishes an injury to the copyright
owner direct enough to permit an award, both in its provision for
statutory damages 228 and in the amendments adding exceptions to the
"for profit" requirement of the criminal copyright infringement
statute.229 Because of this longstanding and express recognition of a
direct connection between copyright infringement and presumed harm
to the owner of the infringed work, a copyright owner will easily meet
the standing requirement of § 1964(c) if the predicate acts for the
claimed pattern of racketeering activity are infringements of the
plaintiffs copyrighted works.230  However, it remains to be seen
whether the presumption of damage applied in the copyright context
would suffice to establish proximate cause in the context of civil RICO
claims brought under § 1964(c). If a RICO plaintiff must prove actual,
rather than statutory, damages to succeed, it would greatly reduce the
number of copyright infringement plaintiffs who meet this
requirement.
III. CONCERNS ABOUT IMPORTING RICO LIABILITY INTO THE
COPYRIGHT CONTEXT
The ambiguities discussed above in both the criminal copyright
infringement and RICO statutes create the potential for civil RICO
claims in copyright cases that were not intended by Congress to be
subject to severe penalties and in a manner that would disserve the
policies underlying copyright. When litigators began to recognize the
powerful tool available to them in the civil enforcement provisions of
the RICO Act,231 one of the most frequent criticisms of civil RICO was
its application outside the intended scope of the legislation-organized
crime.232 Although the Court has interpreted RICO as a broad,
remedial statute, not limited to situations involving organized
228. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); see 145 CONG. REC. H12884 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement
of Rep. Berman) (purpose of increases in statutory damages was to deter piracy by insuring that
cost of infringement "substantially exceed[s] the cost of compliance").
229. See supra Part II.A.3.
230. A more difficult question regarding standing might arise if only one of the alleged
predicate acts was infringement of the plaintiffs copyrighted work and the "pattern" was made
up of a history of infringement of works other than the plaintiffs works. See supra note 198. But
there is at least some precedent that permits a plaintiff to pursue a civil RICO claim even where
the racketeering acts alleged to make up the pattern include infringements of copyrights
belonging to victims other than the plaintiff. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F.
Supp. 2d 1114, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
232. See Blakey & Perry, supra note 154, at 859 & n.14 (noting criticism of civil RICO and
citing numerous articles of critics claiming RICO should not be extended to non-mafia
defendants).
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crime,233 the importation of its broad remedies into the copyright
context raises special concerns that received little attention in the
initial debate over the breadth of RICO and that were never discussed
when Congress added copyright infringement to the list of RICO
predicate acts. Here, the concern is not that RICO will reach non-
mafia defendants, but rather that many defendants accused of
copyright infringement may be threatened with penalties far more
severe than Congress intended, interfering with the policies
underlying copyright.
As discussed above in Part I.B.2, although Congress has
incrementally increased the available criminal penalties under the
Copyright Act since enacting the 1976 Act, its express intent has been
to limit the most severe penalties to those who commit large-scale
infringement 234 and to insulate from felony liability those who engage
in more limited copying for personal use.2 3 5 Where the application of
the criminal copyright infringement provisions rests in the discretion
of federal prosecutors, the public has some assurance that the most
severe penalties will apply only to the most egregious cases of
infringement. 2 3 6 However, the addition of RICO penalties to the
copyright scheme also enables plaintiffs in civil infringement suits to
233. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989) (stating that
although RICO statute "had organized crime as its focus," RICO was "not limited in application
to organized crime"); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (holding that
RICO applies to all "persons," not just to mobsters).
234. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845, 846 n.29 (11th Cir.
1990)). Although there is little evidence of any particular intent in the legislative history of the
Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, which added criminal copyright
infringement as a predicate act for RICO liability, the context of the legislation and the repeated
references to trafficking in counterfeit items suggest that the intent in adding copyright
infringement to the list of predicate acts was to enhance the available penalties for commercial
infringement. See, e.g., supra note 78.
235. For example, the 180-day period for measuring the value of the infringing work or
works was justified as necessary to "exclud[e] from felony prosecution children making copies for
friends as well as other incidental copying of copyrighted works having a relatively low retail
value." H.R. REP. No. 102-997, at 6 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569, 3574. In
addition, in enacting the exception to the profit motive set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2),
Congress emphasized that "De minimis infringement (e.g., a teen-ager copying a software
program for a younger sibling) will not be punished." H.R. REP. No. 105-339, at 8 (1997). In
passing the NET Act, although Congress rejected efforts to increase the minimum threshold for
felony infringement from $2,500 to $5,000, it did so in light of the establishment of a de minimus
threshold for misdemeanor offenses of at least $1,000, reflecting an intent that those who engage
in criminal infringement at a smaller scale should not be as severely punished. Id.
236. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 85 (statement of Professor Gerard E. Lynch) ("Federal
prosecutors have in fact applied the RICO statute relatively sparingly and mostly in contexts
where most would regard their actions as appropriate and the defendants as legitimate targets
for law enforcement activity.").
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seek automatic awards of treble damages. Plaintiffs' lawyers in civil
cases are not bound by prosecutorial discretion to file RICO charges
against only the most serious of offenders; rather, their job is to
maximize their clients' recovery in civil actions and thus to include all
possible good faith bases for recovery in an infringement suit.2 3 7
Although Congress may have intended its enhanced
punishments for copyright infringement, and particularly for criminal
infringement, to apply only to willful commercial infringement, adding
criminal infringement as a RICO "racketeering activity" may have the
practical effect of adding a punitive component to many ordinary civil
infringement cases through the mandatory treble damage provision
and creating a situation in criminal cases in which a "pattern" of mere
misdemeanor copyright infringements could result in a twenty-year
prison sentence. 238
This situation creates a clash of interpretive schemes, in which
the well-established practice in RICO cases of interpreting the RICO
statute broadly 239 conflicts with the well-established practice in
copyright cases of interpreting the copyright statute narrowly.
Moreover, while RICO liability has grown in spite of a clear
congressional purpose to primarily target organized crime, the Court
has shown heavy reliance on the intent of Congress in enacting
specific provisions of the copyright scheme. 240 The unresolved
237. See, e.g., id. ("Many lawyers have reportedly remarked that if a client has a
legitimate claim that can be cast in RICO terms, it is virtually malpractice not to add a RICO
cause of action to the complaint-how can a lawyer committed to represent her client zealously
fail to take advantage of a provision that provides three times the payoff . . . . And, into the
bargain, framing the suit as a RICO claim labels the defendant a racketeer-terminology that, at
least marginally, increases the settlement pressure on defendants worried about the
reputational damage of extended and possibly unsuccessful defense of a lawsuit.").
238. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2001). Of course, as noted above, prosecutorial discretion
would likely prevent such a case from being brought in the criminal context, as government
resources would be better spent prosecuting those who engage in felony infringement. But just as
a twenty-year prison term for someone engaging in two or more related acts of misdemeanor
copyright infringement (i.e., the value of which does not exceed $2,500 per incident) within a ten
year period would seem excessive to most and exceeds the intent of Congress in limiting felony
cases to those involving significant losses to copyright owners, the imposition of a treble damage
award for the same conduct when the Copyright Act already provides for recovery of statutory
damages up to $150,000 for each willful act of infringement seems equally excessive and beyond
the intent of Congress. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2001).
239. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tele. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., Inc. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
240. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1985) (discussing careful
deliberation and caution of Congress in enacting and amending criminal copyright provisions
and "wisdom of leaving it to the legislature to define crime and prescribe penalties"); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (noting that judiciary's
"reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative
guidance is a recurring theme" in copyright and that courts should be "circumspect" in
construing the scope of Copyright Act when "Congress has not clearly marked our course").
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ambiguities in both the application of the criminal copyright
infringement provisions and the scope of RICO's enterprise, pattern,
conduct, and standing provisions, when combined with the competing
interpretive schemes that have been adopted in the two statutes,
make it difficult to predict the full scope of RICO's application in
copyright infringement cases. 2 4 1 These uncertainties leave copyright
defendants with the possibility that RICO claims in many civil
infringement suits would survive motions to dismiss, which is likely to
weigh heavily in a defendant's decision whether to mount a defense in
cases of questionable liability, rather than settle to avoid risk of a
large damage award. 242
241. In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., the Supreme Court made
clear that even if the RICO statute's provisions are to be broadly interpreted, the criminal
statutes that form the basis for the predicate racketeering acts must be narrowly construed
according to the rule of lenity: '[W]hen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one
harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear
and definite language."' 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 359-60 (1987)); see also Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 412 (Justice Ginsburg, concurring) ( "The
Court is rightly reluctant, as I see it, to extend RICO's domain further by endorsing the
expansive definition of 'extortion' adopted by the Seventh Circuit"). While Schneidler's narrow
reading of the Hobbes Act in the context of a civil RICO claim suggests that the ambiguities in
the criminal copyright infringement statute would also be narrowly construed, it provides little
guidance in evaluating whether or how the intent of Congress in its treatment of copyright law
would be considered in the context of evaluating the application of RICO's enterprise, pattern,
conduct, and standing requirements to copyright infringement cases alleging RICO violations.
242. In fact, such cases are beginning to make their way into the federal courts, with
mixed results in terms of surviving initial motions to dismiss the RICO claims. See, e.g., Internet
Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755 (D. Colo. 2007) (finding allegations sufficient to support
RICO claim based on criminal infringement as a predicate act but insufficient allegations of
enterprise distinct from defendant); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust
Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 131, 153 (D. Maine 2006) (dismissing RICO claims based on criminal
copyright infringement because of failure to allege proximate causation of damage from alleged
infringement); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1127-28 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (permitting RICO claims to go forward in copyright infringement suit against
"gatekeepers" of pornography websites alleged to have infringed copyrighted photographs of
plaintiff). The handful of reported decisions applying RICO in the copyright context do not
provide a reliable indication of the number of civil copyright infringement cases being filed that
also include civil RICO claims, and there is no easy way to determine how many pending or
settled copyright infringement cases also include civil RICO allegations. Although this was a
source of frustration in early studies of the impact of civil RICO on the federal court system, see
Blakely & Perry, supra note 154, at 870 & n. 47; Hearings, supra note 85 (statement of Gerald E.
Lynch) (discussing difficulties in assessing true number of civil RICO cases because of single-
claim designation form used by Administrative Office of U.S. Courts in tracking substantive
nature of cases), it still remains the practice of the federal courts to require that litigants check
only one box in their civil filing forms to indicate the nature of the dispute. Thus, when statistics
are compiled, there is no systematic way to determine whether a case includes both a copyright
infringement and a copyright-based RICO claim short of reviewing all copyright and RICO
complaints filed in every district in the country. In an admittedly unscientific sampling of
complaints in several district courts accessible through the PACER system that were designated
as copyright cases, the author estimated that just under 2% of the civil copyright infringement
cases surveyed included a RICO claim as well as copyright infringement claims for an 18-month
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The breadth of RICO's civil remedy provisions presents a
number of important concerns. First, copyright infringement differs
from most of the other RICO predicate acts in that the Copyright Act
creates a complex regulatory scheme that aims to benefit the public by
allowing access to creative works and not simply to protect copyright
owners from infringement. Second, the "private attorney general"
function of the civil RICO provisions is unnecessary in the context of
copyright infringement, as the Copyright Act already provides a more
than adequate civil enforcement mechanism. Third, the reputational
stigma created by allegations of racketeering conduct raises special
concerns in the copyright context in light of the murky legal standards
governing liability and the potential for over-deterrence to harm the
public interest. Finally, by allowing racketeering charges to be
asserted in a context in which the wrongful conduct is not socially
condemned and, at least within a large subset of the public, the law is
widely disobeyed, the inclusion of copyright infringement in the list of
RICO predicate acts may ultimately deter good faith, fair uses of
copyrighted works, while simultaneously limiting copyright owners'
ability to deter and punish large-scale commercial piracy.
A. Differences Between Copyright Infringement and Other RICO
Predicate Acts
Copyright infringement differs from other types of RICO
predicate acts because those who test the boundaries of copyright law
serve the public good in ways that are at least as important as those
who seek to enforce copyrights. Because clear lines seldom
distinguish ideas (which are not copyrightable) from expressions of
those ideas (which are copyrightable), original components of a work
(protected) from unoriginal components (unprotected), and fair use
from impermissible use of a copyrighted work, testing and clarifying
those lines through litigation serves the public interest.243
When the potential negative outcome of litigation increases
dramatically, such as by adding RICO liability to the already
period preceding June of 2004; when repeated for the 18-month period preceding June of 2010,
the number was comparable.
243. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994). In Fogerty, the Court noted
that copyright's primary purpose is not to provide financial reward to authors for their labor, but
rather to fulfill the Constitution's stated objective that copyright laws be enacted to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." Id. at 526 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The Court
stated, "Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public
through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law
be demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of
meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that
plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement." Id. at 527.
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substantial civil infringement remedies, there is greater incentive to
settle cases early and thereby avoid court decisions that might better
demarcate uses of creative works that are protected by the copyright
monopoly from those that fall within the public domain. The
staggering penalties facing copyright defendants strongly suggest that
defendants who would otherwise test the boundaries of copyright will
simply choose to accede to copyright owners' demands, even where
those demands unreasonably expand the limited monopoly.244
The other crimes included in the long list of predicate acts
considered as racketeering activity for purposes of RICO liability
simply do not share the countervailing interests that copyright
presents and the Constitution recognizes. 245 For example, no public
interest encourages a con artist to take as much as legally possible
without technically defrauding the victim, or an applicant for
citizenship to stretch the truth so long as the misrepresentations do
244. The P2P hypothetical provides a dramatic illustration of this point. If an infringing
P2P user lives in a dormitory of a private college and gains access to the Internet through her
college's wireless network, both the student and the college could be named in a lawsuit for
copyright infringement and civil RICO damages. The RIAA has already put large institutions
like universities and corporations on notice that it may seek to hold them responsible for policing
their servers and prohibiting access to students and employees who participate in illegal file-
sharing. See, e.g., Geoff Duncan, RIAA Cracks Down on College Music Sharing,
DIGITALTRENDS.COM, (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.digitaltrends.com/lifestyle/riaa-cracks-down-
on-college-music-sharing; Rebecca Dana, To Fight Music Piracy, Industry Goes to Schools, WASH.
POST, Aug. 28, 2003, at A01 (discussing RIAA letters and warnings to colleges and universities
regarding infringement by students and changes made by some of them in response to the
letters); Jon Healey, Industry Targets File Swappers' Employers; The RIAA Sends Letters to
About 300 Companies, Warning of "Significant Legal Damages," L.A. TIMES, March 18, 2003, §3,
at 1; Christine Winter, Corporations Hit With Copyright Warnings, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 23,
2003, at 3G. Secondary infringers like the college have deeper pockets-which is the primary
reason that plaintiffs target them-and thus can usually afford to defend themselves. They also
have more defenses potentially available to them, particularly if they can show that they fall
within the "safe harbor" provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512
(2006), or if the criminal copyright infringement statute is interpreted more narrowly than the
civil enforcement provisions have been interpreted in recent years. If the college defended the
claims against it at trial, it would help to "demarcate" more clearly the lines between permissible
and impermissible conduct in the distribution of copyrighted works. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at
524-27 (1994). Despite its financial ability to defend the suit and the availability of some strong
possible defenses, the college likely would give in to the copyright owners' demands in light of the
extent of the possible damage award and the potential stigma of being labeled as a "racketeer."
Settlement of these cases would also not necessarily accomplish deterrence of widespread
infringement because such informal resolutions of copyright suits do not carry the same social
and moral weight as a judgment after a jury trial. See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A.
Eaton, Rule 68 Offers of Judgment: The Practices and Opinions of Experienced Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Attorneys, 241 F.R.D. 332, 350 (2007) (discussing survey reflecting
lawyers' and clients' concerns about a formal, public declaration of wrongdoing when judgment is
entered against them, as opposed to the private and usually confidential nature of settlements).
245. See infra note 275 (describing other crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) that
constitute predicate acts for purposes of RICO liability).
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not violate the federal laws against unlawful procurement of
citizenship.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized that, unlike
"private attorney general" plaintiffs in civil rights cases, 24 6 who are
typically individuals of limited means asserting claims against deep-
pocket defendants,247 both plaintiffs and defendants in copyright
infringement suits "'can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to
starving artists."'248  Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the purpose of the Copyright Act is "to encourage the
production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the
good of the public." 24 9 Indeed, the Court has averred:
[T]he policies served by the Copyright Act are more complex, more measured, than
simply maximizing the number of meritorious suits for copyright infringement. . . . We
have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while
"intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward," are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good.
2 5 0
In interpreting the 1909 Copyright Act, the Court explained
that the limited scope of the statutory monopoly enjoyed by copyright
246. Similar to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act allowing civil suits to redress
injuries suffered as a result of unlawful discrimination, See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)-(3)
(2006), the RICO statute expressly permits private plaintiffs to bring civil suits against those
who have injured them through the commission of a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c). The legislative history for both of these statutory schemes reflects consideration by
Congress of the need for "private attorney general" plaintiffs to bring civil suits because of the
lack of sufficient government resources to enforce laws prohibiting discrimination and organized
criminal conduct. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
151 (1987) (describing civil RICO provisions in § 1964(c) as "bring[ing] to bear the pressure of
'private attorneys general' on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources
are deemed inadequate"); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978)
(discussing legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1964). Because plaintiffs in such cases were
often "impecunious" and unable to "litigate their claims against defendants with more
resources," attorneys' fee awards are generally available to prevailing plaintiffs in such cases and
unavailable to prevailing defendants. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524; see also Christiansburg Garment,
434 U.S. at 418 (holding that prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases were entitled to an award
of fees and costs as a matter of course, while prevailing defendants in such suits could only
recover fees and costs if the lawsuit was frivolous or brought in bad faith); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2006) (providing only for award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in civil RICO cases). In contrast,
the Supreme Court has noted that, unlike in civil rights litigation, because prevailing defendants
in copyright cases serve the interests of the Copyright Act as effectively as prevailing plaintiffs,
defendants do not bear a heavier burden than plaintiffs in recovering attorneys' fees under the
Copyright Act. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526-27, 534 (noting that a successful defense of a copyright
suit may further the policies underlying the statute as much as a successful prosecution of an
infringement claim by a copyright owner).
247. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524.
248. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D. Va.
1985), affd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986)).
249. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added).
250. Id. at 526 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984)).
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owners reflects "a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts." The Court thus
concluded that "the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good." 2 5 1  Similarly, in
interpreting the 1976 Act, the Court emphasized that to achieve
copyright's purpose of promoting creativity, "copyright assures
authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work."2 5 2
This delicate balance between encouraging artistic creativity through
a limited monopoly and promoting wide-spread public access to
creative works is unique to copyright and distinguishes it from other
contexts in which courts have interpreted the civil RICO statute
expansively.
B. Civil RICO's "Private Attorney General" Function Is Unnecessary in
the Copyright Context
Most of the initial justifications for broad application of RICO
remedies to contexts well outside the stated purpose of CongreSs253
either do not apply at all or carry much less weight in the copyright
context. Private justice actions like RICO claims have been said to
serve the public good "in supplementing governmental regulatory
resources, deterring wrongful conduct, and providing relief for victims
who may have no other effective remedy."2 5 4  In copyright
infringement cases, however, unlike cases involving other RICO
predicate crimes, the "public interest" served by litigation does not
depend on who prevails, because the suits themselves clarify the scope
of the limited monopoly.255 In fact, none of the purported justifications
for civil RICO as a "private justice action" apply in the copyright
context.
First, unlike most predicate acts listed in the RICO statute,
Congress never intended civil copyright infringement actions to
251. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
252. Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
253. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) (describing civil RICO provisions in § 1964(c) as "bring[ing] to bear the pressure of 'private
attorneys general' on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are
deemed inadequate").
254. Bucy, supra note 156, at 17. Bucy goes on to note, however, that "[clourts have also
noted how disruptive such actions may be to an already comprehensive enforcement scheme . ..
Id.
255. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527 (1994).
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"supplement" government enforcement; criminal enforcement of
copyright law was an afterthought. 2 5 6 Congress conceived of copyright
as a civil enforcement scheme wherein private parties protect and
enforce their own copyright interests, probably because the limitations
on this purely economic right exist for the public good. Under the
enforcement provisions of the Copyright Act itself, statutory damages
are available so that plaintiffs can obtain a significant monetary
recovery even if actual damages and the illicit profits are low or
difficult to prove. 257  Orders for the impoundment and ultimate
destruction of unlawfully manufactured copies are also available for
prevailing plaintiffs, 258 as are attorneys' fees and costs. 25 9 While the
RICO statute certainly enhances the amount of damages recoverable
by a plaintiff in a civil action, it does not serve to supplement
government regulatory resources, as the government has never been
the primary enforcer of copyright laws.
Second, notwithstanding the increased remedies for
infringement over the past few decades, deterrence is not (or at least
should not be) the primary goal of copyright law as a whole. 260 While
the Copyright Act certainly provides penalties for infringement that
are intended to deter such conduct,261 the Act serves the larger
purpose of "enriching the general public through access to creative
works" 2 6 2 and creates a complex regulatory structure governing the
nature and scope of copyright owners' rights and public access to
copyrighted works. Thus, over-deterrence is (or at least should be) an
important concern in the context of copyright law, unlike other
underlying RICO offenses, where over-deterrence is of much less
concern.263 For example, society loses nothing if severe RICO
256. See supra Part III.A (discussing development of criminal copyright infringement
provisions); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 221 (1985) ("Congress [has] chiefly relied
upon an array of civil remedies to provide copyright holders protection against infringement ...
."); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505 (2006), but in exercising its power to render criminal certain forms
of copyright infringement, it has acted with exceeding caution.
257. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
258. 17 U.S.C. § 503.
259. 17 U.S.C. § 505.
260. A discussion of the legitimacy of deterrence theory in law enforcement is beyond the
scope of this article. One of the stated purposes of the RICO legislation was to deter the
infiltration of legitimate business by those engaged in organized criminal activities, see United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588 (1981), and one of the stated purposes of each increase in
the available remedies under the Copyright Act has been deterrence of copyright infringement;
see also supra Part II.B.2. This article simply addresses the effectiveness of the addition of RICO
penalties to the already extensive available penalties under the Copyright Act in serving the goal
of deterring infringement and the dangers of over-deterrence.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
262. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
263. See infra notes 284-286 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.D.
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penalties deter would-be con artists from soliciting money through the
mails under some misleading pretense that does not fall squarely
within the mail fraud statute.2 64 In contrast, if those inclined to test
the boundaries between the copyright monopoly and the public
domain are deterred by the threat of RICO damages in addition to the
already large damages available under the Copyright Act, this over-
deterrence will harm the public interest in access to creative works,
and the copyright monopoly will ultimately extend far beyond its
intended reach. 265 Given the expansiveness of pre-existing remedies
available under the civil and criminal provisions of the Copyright Act,
additional remedies under the RICO statute are not needed to deter
infringement and pose a great risk of deterring desirable conduct in
exploring the boundaries of the copyright monopoly.
Third, the purpose of private justice actions-to provide relief
for victims otherwise bereft of effective remedies-is also inapplicable
in the copyright context. The Copyright Act already provides for more
than adequate relief for victims of copyright infringement. 266 While
victims of infringement certainly deserve compensation for their
losses, the addition of RICO penalties serves no compensatory
purpose. 267 If private attorneys general were needed to prosecute
copyright cases, the Copyright Act's provisions for statutory damages,
ranging from $250 to $150,000 per infringement, and for awards of
attorneys' fees and costs would certainly fill the vacuum without
importing all of the baggage that comes with the RICO statute. In the
copyright context, RICO damages serve a solely punitive purpose in a
system that already grants extensive remedies for willful
infringement. 2 6 8
264. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
265. See infra Part TV.D.
266. For example, successful victims may recover statutory damages even if actual
damages are difficult to prove, as well as attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing the
action. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c), 505 (2006).
267. The Copyright Act's statutory damage remedy already serves the purpose of
compensating plaintiffs for infringements that have de minimis value or that are difficult to
value, as well as serving as a vehicle for punishing willful infringement and deterring future
infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1337
(9th Cir. 1990). See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 14.04 (2004). Thus, the
effect of the addition of RICO treble damages to the already existing remedies available under
the Copyright Act is purely punitive and serves no compensatory purpose.
268. In addressing the so-called "myths" propounded by critics of civil RICO, Blakey &
Perry rejected arguments about, inter alia, the creation of a "floodgate" of litigation and the
potential for litigation abuse. Blakey & Perry, supra note 154, at 869-70, 877-79. However,
Blakey & Perry's rejection of these arguments was framed in terms of the assertion of frivolous
RICO claims and assumed, without any real support, that RICO remedies were justified because
the existing remedies for RICO's predicate acts were inadequate. Id. Even if this were true
outside of the copyright context, it has little application here, where the Copyright Act already
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Prior to the addition of criminal infringement as a RICO
predicate act in 1996, the consistent view of Congress and the courts
had been to maintain the Copyright Act as a self-contained statutory
vehicle for balancing copyright owners' interests in receiving
compensation for their works and the public's interest in accessing
them.2 69  If victims of copyright infringement deserve more
compensation than that provided by the current remedies under the
Copyright Act, then the most appropriate course of action would be to
amend the remedies available under the Copyright Act rather than to
import RICO's broad statutory scheme into the copyright context.
While perhaps an important tool for victims of other crimes who would
otherwise lack any civil remedy, the "private attorney general"
function of RICO is unnecessary in light of the extensive civil
remedies already available under the Copyright Act. Furthermore,
the importation of civil RICO remedies into civil copyright
infringement cases could upset the delicate balance between the
copyright monopoly and the public domain.
C. The Stigma of "Racketeer" and Its Effect on Settlement
The stigma of being labeled a "racketeer" and the effect of
RICO claims on the settlement value of cases cause legitimate concern
in the copyright context and caution against civil RICO liability for
most infringement claims. Public shaming, like that which arises
from labeling a defendant as a "racketeer," can be a powerful tool in
enforcing social norms.2 70 However, the use of the label as a shaming
device is unfair when private litigants have the power to impose it on
a wide class of people whose conduct does not approach the kind of
activity that the label is commonly understood to describe. It will
ultimately also fail as a method for enforcing social norms, because
the more that label is applied in a way deemed unfair and inaccurate,
provides a more than adequate mechanism for recovering lost revenues and the costs of suit. The
reach of RICO is broad enough, and the law governing criminal copyright infringement is murky
enough, that non-frivolous RICO claims based on copyright infringement may be asserted in
many circumstances in which RICO would be an inappropriate and excessive remedy, but
arguably available under existing law.
269. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 221, 225 (1985); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 301
(2006) (illustrating Congress' intent, through preemption provision, to limit copyright to a
federal scheme and prevent states from imposing their own inconsistent copyright protections
and remedies).
270. See generally Kahan, supra note 18 (discussing the current "renaissance in American
law" embracing shaming penalties for nonviolent common and white collar crimes); Katyal,
supra note 26 (noting the deterrent effect that public shaming can have on crime).
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the less social stigma will be associated with the label, making it
increasingly less effective at inducing shame. 271
The stigma of the "racketeer" label, even if only in a civil
complaint and not a final judgment or criminal conviction, raises
concerns in the copyright context similar to those expressed
immediately following enactment of RICO, 2 7 2 but with greater
potential negative effects due to the public interest served by
defendants in copyright infringement suits. 2 7 3 In their defense of civil
RICO, Gerard Blakey and Thomas Perry argue that the reputational
stigma of being labeled a racketeer in a civil RICO claim is of no
concern, because "the racketeer label inhibits, rather than facilitates,
settlement" in typical fraud cases. 2 7 4 Even if this were accepted as
271. See Kahan, supra note 18, at 625; Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1397-98, 1403-05, 1425-29 (2002) (discussing effects of lack of compliance
with "penumbral crimes" such as speeding violations).
272. The application of civil RICO liability to "garden variety fraud" cases inspired a
great deal of initial criticism, with opponents of the broad application of RICO liability against
defendants who had no affiliation with organized crime arguing that legitimate businesses were
paying extortionate amounts to settle "garden-variety fraud" cases to avoid the stigma of the
racketeer label. Compare Bucy, supra note 156, at 23 (noting that civil RICO allegations can be
harmful to defendants in terms of the cost of defending against nonmeritorious claims and in
terms of "reputational damage when [defendants are] named in a serious civil lawsuit, where
treble damages are at stake and they are branded as 'racketeers'), with Blakey & Perry, supra
note 154, at 875-76 (rejecting complaints regarding the stigmatizing effects of the racketeer label
and asserting that the label "inhibits, rather than facilitates, settlement"). This debate often
referenced Justice Marshall's statement that "[miany a prudent defendant, facing ruinous
exposure, will decide to settle even a case with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO
has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils that it was designed to combat."
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In fact,
once the broad scope of civil RICO's reach had become clear, Congress considered amending the
statute to provide that, in civil RICO cases that did not involve a crime of violence, plaintiffs
would be precluded from using the terms "racketeer" or "organized crime" in any documents filed
with or oral presentations made to the court. Hearings, supra note 85 (text of proposed
legislation). As one Congressman stated in support of the amendment,
Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of the cases have not been filed against
mobs or mobsters and other professional criminals to strip them of their ill-gotten
gains. Instead, civil RICO cases have been filed against legitimate businesses,
churches, the FBI, Government officials, and the like. All of these individuals and
entities have been tarred with the label of racketeer.
Id. at 22 (statement of Rep. Smith).
273. See infra Part III.A.
274. Blakey & Perry, supra note 154, at 875. In challenging the assertion that legitimate
businesses would choose to settle rather than vigorously defend against RICO allegations,
Blakey and Perry rely on a report indicating that at least some "seasoned litigators in the RICO
area" believe that adding a RICO claim to a suit inhibits settlement where legitimate businesses
are involved. See id. (citing A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and Criminal RICO Legislation
and Litigation: A Report of the RICO Cases Committee, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CRIM. JUST. REP.
121, at 12123. While this anecdotal report loosely supports Blakey and Perry's assertion, their
discussion oversimplifies the complex considerations that go into litigation strategy and
settlement decisions. Their presumption that "if the plaintiffs suit has no merit, the chance of
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true, the same reasoning does not apply to typical copyright
infringement suits in which plaintiffs might assert civil RICO claims.
Unlike "garden-variety fraud" cases, copyright cases involve a complex
statutory scheme designed to balance competing interests between
copyright owners and public access to their works. These competing
interests cannot be properly balanced when plaintiffs are given far
more chips at the bargaining table than defendants.
Unlike the other crimes in the laundry list of predicate acts
that qualify as "racketeering activity" under the RICO statute, the
crime of copyright infringement causes only monetary damages, and
the victim-the copyright owner-enjoys only limited property rights
in the works infringed. 275 Whereas plaintiffs in fraud cases have been
deprived of tangible money or property to which defendants have no
right, copyright owners are not absolutely entitled to their "property,"
but possess only a specifically limited "bundle" of intangible rightS276
subject to numerous exceptions and technical requirements. 277
Because copyright protections are limited, many uses may be made of
this property without the owners' consent and without any legal
success is zero, and zero multiplied by three (or any other number) is still zero," id. at 876, is
flawed. In the author's experience (an admittedly anecdotal response to the anecdotal support
offered for Blakey and Perry's conclusions), where claims are truly frivolous, defendants will
generally choose to move to dismiss or for summary judgment rather than to settle the case for
anything but a nuisance value. However, where the underlying law is ambiguous and subject to
competing interpretations or where a motion to dismiss the case before trial has failed,
defendants become much more interested in settling, particularly in RICO cases where their
business reputations could be injured by a determination that they engaged in "racketeering."
This is because, where the law is ambiguous or a motion to dismiss has failed, the chance of
success is not zero. Rarely is anything certain in litigation other than the fact that a party will
incur attorneys' fees and costs in going forward with the suit, and thus the risk of treble damages
and the label of "racketeer" will certainly be considered in the settlement calculus and will in
many cases lead to earlier or more costly settlements than in cases where RICO is not alleged.
275. The list of predicate acts that may constitute "racketeering activity" for purposes of
RICO liability is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2010). It includes the commission of state law
felonies that involve murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance; the commission of a host of federal crimes,
including bribery, counterfeiting, felony theft, embezzlement from pension funds, extortion,
numerous crimes involving fraud, unlawful procurement of citizenship, the sale of obscene
matters, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, slavery or trafficking in persons, illegal
gambling activities, money laundering, murder, sexual exploitation of children, trafficking in
counterfeit goods or services, trafficking in contraband cigarettes, violating restrictions on
payments or loans to labor organizations, felonious drug crimes, and immigration violations. Id.
Aside from the possible First Amendment concerns raised by the obscenity crimes included in the
list of predicate acts, criminal copyright infringement is distinct among these crimes because of
the public interest in allowing the fair use of copyrighted works and access to works in the public
domain.
276. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2010).
277. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107-122, 408. Copyright owners also have no right to the
ideas underlying or contained in the work, and they have no right to preclude fair uses of the
work. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 107, 301.
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sanction, making copyright infringement distinct from the other RICO
predicate acts.
Moreover, the case law interpreting the Copyright Act provides
little certainty for defendants evaluating the scope of their potential
liability. For example, few bright lines exist to guide defendants
about whether uses of copyrighted works are permitted fair uses or
are infringing;278 what differentiates an idea from the expression of
that idea; 2 79 what state of mind is required for "willful"
infringement; 280 or how the broad construction of the RICO statute can
be reconciled with the traditionally narrow construction of the
Copyright Act. 281
Thus, although innocent defendants accused of fraud may very
well choose to litigate to protect their good name rather than settle a
fraud-based RICO claim because they can have some confidence in
being able to prove their innocence at trial,282 even "innocent"
copyright infringers can be subject to civil penalties under the strict-
liability regime of copyright law. Given the murky boundaries
between permissible and impermissible uses of copyrighted works and
the fact that liability can result even for unintentional violations, a
heightened incentive already exists for defendants to settle copyright
infringement lawsuits to minimize their exposure to damage awards.
Adding the potential for treble damages and the label of "racketeer" is
likely to increase both defendants' incentive to settle and the
settlement value of infringement suits that include civil RICO claims.
In some contexts, including civil cases arising out of most other
RICO predicate acts, it would be appropriate for the law to provide
heightened incentives for defendants to settle quickly and for greater
amounts. For example, it makes perfect sense for the law to provide
heightened incentives for a defendant to settle a civil RICO claim
arising from a kidnapping, both to spare the victim the ordeal of
discovery, trial, and appeal, and to expedite compensation to the
victim. In the context of copyright infringement, however, the
remedies available in a simple infringement suit already provide an
incentive for defendants whose conduct falls within the gray area of
permissible copying to settle rather than incur the expense and
uncertainty of trial. The possibility of treble damages and the
278. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
279. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
280. See infra Part II.A.2.
281. See infra Part II.B.
282. See Blakey & Perry, supra note 154, at 876 (asserting that "if the plaintiffs suit has
no merit, the chance of success is zero" and thus that innocent defendants in fraud cases will
have no greater incentive to settle even if a RICO claim is added to the suit).
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reputational harm from the label of "racketeer" tips the balance far too
heavily in favor of plaintiffs, especially where the Supreme Court has
recognized that testing the boundaries of the copyright monopoly
serves important public interests.283
Providing too much bargaining power to plaintiffs in copyright
cases, who typically seek to prohibit others from using or selling
copyrighted works, will not only encourage defendants to settle rather
than test the limits of copyright protection through litigation, but will
also chill legitimate uses of copyrighted works.
D. Problems with Over-deterrence and Under-deterrence
In addition to the problems created by the potential chilling
effect on legitimate uses of copyrighted works, the inclusion of civil
RICO claims in copyright infringement cases is unlikely to deter the
most egregious infringers and may ultimately work to the
disadvantage of copyright owners. The addition of a civil RICO claim
to a copyright infringement lawsuit is likely to tip the balance in favor
of settlement for many risk-averse defendants who would otherwise
have legitimate defenses to copyright infringement, but some will still
litigate, and the outcome of those cases that do result in judgments or
appellate decisions will impact the subsequent behavior of some
potential infringers.
If courts award both copyright and RICO damages for large-
scale copying for commercial purposes, the publicity about a large
damage award could certainly have a deterrent effect, but on whom?
Those who seek to make legitimate uses of copyrighted works are
likely to be deterred, as law abiding citizens are more likely to alter
their conduct to fall more squarely within what is permitted by law
where the penalties associated with crossing the line are severe and
include the possibility of public shame and reputational harm. 2 84
Those who knowingly infringe for private use, rather than for profit,
283. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994) (noting that a successful
defense of a copyright suit may further the policies underlying the statute as much as a
successful prosecution of an infringement claim by a copyright owner). While copyright law was
intended as a vehicle for inspiring creativity, too broad an expansion of the "limited" copyright
monopoly can stifle creativity and thus interfere with the purposes underlying copyright; see
Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (2004) (noting
that the Disney Corporation built its entertainment empire by "taking works that were in the
public domain, and parroting, changing, improving them to produce something new" but that the
law has changed so dramatically in the past forty years that the kind of creativity that Disney
took advantage of may no longer be possible).
284. See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 271, at 1422-25; cf. Katyal, supra note 26, at 1059
(noting in the context of discussing the effect of gaps in information between the public and law
enforcement, "[i]f individuals do not know whether a given act falls on the positive or negative
side of the line, then they may be deterred from pursuing it").
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may also be initially deterred by a well-publicized award of significant
damages, because the risk of high sanctions outweighs their small
personal gain. However, the deterrent effect on such infringers may
still be fairly small or only short-lived in light of the slim likelihood of
being detected and sued.285 Those infringers whose conduct inspired
the addition of civil RICO remedies for copyright infringement-the
"pirates" who copy and sell others' works for commercial profit-are
least likely to be deterred by a well-publicized award of significant
damages for similar infringement, because the high profits available
for such enterprises likely outweigh the low risk of being caught even
if the potential penalties are severe. 286
Thus, while successful pursuit of copyright and civil RICO
remedies against a "pirate" who engages in large-scale copying for
profit may end up deterring some willful infringers from future
infringement, it is most likely to deter those who would serve the
public interest by making legitimate uses of copyrighted works and to
fail to deter other commercial copyright pirates. The potential harm
to the public interest in access to copyrighted works from over-
deterrence is simply not worth the possibility of deterring some willful
infringers. 287 Because the enhanced penalties available under the
285. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 26, at 1006 ("Beccaria and Becker have observed that
the expected penalty for criminal activity is not only the sentence in the criminal code, but also a
function of the probability that one will get caught.").
286. See, e.g., supra note 234 (discussing legislative history for Anti-Counterfeiting
Consumer Protection Act); Katyal, supra note 26 at 1011 (noting that in the context of
cybercrime, "it may be difficult to increase the sanction enough to compensate for a very low
probability of getting caught").
287. As one author has noted, RICO's treble damages provision seeks "to serve the
common good by deterring future violations through large judgments." Bucy, supra note 156, at
17. But such remedies should be limited in the copyright context, where there is as much, if not
more, risk that the common good will be disserved by the application of RICO's treble damage
provision because it over-deters conduct that benefits the public and that copyright policy should
encourage. Those who are most likely to be deterred by enhanced penalties are those who seek to
use copyrighted works for what are arguably legitimate purposes but who are unwilling to take
the risk that they have crossed the line. For example, several years ago a Baltimore artist who
documented and commented upon the experience of movie-goers by taking a camcorder with him
into Baltimore movie theaters decided to give up his art as a result of a newly-enacted Maryland
law that made it a crime to videotape inside a movie theater. Michael Ollove, Last Picture Show:
With a New Maryland Copyright Law Set to Make His Art Illegal, Bootlegger Jon Routson Faces
the End, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 22, 2004, at 1C, 5C.
His films of films-often poorly framed, poorly focused and occasionally with a big fat
head obscuring the view-have been shown in a New York gallery and generated
positive notices in publications such as The New York Times, The New Yorker, and the
Village Voice. His work is, in the view of some critics, a clever comment on American
film and the movie-going experience.
Id. at IC. Because he does not want to risk going to jail, this artist will no longer be taking his
camcorder into theaters with him despite never intending to use his videotapes to sell bootleg
copies of the films; his intent was only to create a form of conceptual art that made its own
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RICO statute are unlikely to deter the very offenders that the law
intended to target-the true "pirates"-permitting such penalties
creates more problems than it solves.
Furthermore, if the first well-publicized cases testing the scope
of civil RICO liability in copyright infringement cases involve willful
infringements for private use, such as those in the P2P file sharing
hypothetical, the interests of copyright law likely will be harmed
regardless of which party succeeds in the litigation. A judgment
imposing RICO liability against infringers for private use would likely
be met with wide-spread public disapproval, as the public has already
scorned civil lawsuits against private-use infringers that did not allege
racketeering. 28 8  With so many people engaged in unauthorized
downloading of music, films, and software, the imposition of severe
punishment might fuel further disrespect for the law rather than
deter illegal conduct, because the existing social norm, at least among
the majority of the sixty million P2P users in the United States, does
not condemn this conduct. 289 Moreover, a well-publicized judgment for
the defense in a case involving infringement for private use would deal
copyright owners a significant setback in their attempts to change
existing social norms, due to enhanced public perception that
infringement for private use is either not wrong or will not be
punished. 290 Those who would otherwise obey the law, even a law
"cultural comment." Id. at 5C. While the resulting loss to the world of art may be debatable (the
artist also "once had a show in New York that consisted of allowing five cats to roam free in a
gallery"), this artist's work could very likely be found to be protected by both the First
Amendment and the fair use defense if he were to choose to challenge the law. Id. Instead, he
has opted to self-police and to avoid the potential risks of prosecution or litigation.
288. See, e.g., Richard J. Dalton Jr., Music Industry Takes Aim at Pirates, NEWSDAY, Jan.
22, 2004, at A50 (discussing the resolve of online file sharers to stay ahead of industry efforts to
enforce copyrights online, noting that "while the recording industry is suing individuals, software
designers have already developed technology to protect the identity of those sharing music, and
more is on the way"); William Glanz, Music Pirates Turn Up Volume; Recording Industry Suits
Fail to Squelch Use of Online Services, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept. 6, 2004, at C17 (reporting
that file sharing "remains widespread" in spite of the RLAA's lawsuits against almost 5000
individual file sharers and noting that file sharing appeared to have increased in the past year);
File Sharing, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/issues/file-sharing (last
visited Oct. 26, 2010) (describing the RIAA's campaign of lawsuits against file-sharers as
"misguided" and "irrational").
289. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 1, at 560-68 (providing a detailed discussion of social
norms in the context of copyright enforcement); Kahan, supra note 18, at 625; Raymond, supra
note 271, at 1400.
290. Those who argued against increased criminal sanctions for copyright infringement
in the years between the enactment of the 1909 Act and the Sound Recording Act of 1971 noted
that increasing sanctions could lead to reduced enforcement because of the perception of
excessive punishment. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., DISCUSSION
AND COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 31 (Comm. Print 1963) (statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein,
Chairman) (noting that where penalties are perceived as being too large, juries will not impose
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they deem unwise, may decide that infringement is more like speeding
than shoplifting, and infringing activity could increase. 291
Attempts to broadly apply civil RICO penalties to "garden
variety" copyright cases could also work to the ultimate disadvantage
of copyright owners by creating precedent that hampers their ability
to pursue the most egregious offenders who seek to reap large profits
from the commercial exploitation of copyrighted works. 292 To date, the
criminal copyright provision has been the subject of very little judicial
attention as compared to the civil provisions. As more and more
courts deal with civil RICO claims in copyright infringement cases,
key issues such as the meaning of "willfulness," whether the criminal
infringement provisions extend to secondary infringers, and the scope
of the "enterprise" requirement in the copyright context will need to be
explored and addressed in the context of civil litigation. If commercial
disputes present the first opportunities for courts to resolve these
ambiguities, and if they construe the criminal provisions of the
Copyright Act narrowly to limit the availability of civil RICO remedies
in copyright disputes, these decisions could ultimately limit the power
of prosecutors to win criminal infringement penalties in more severe
cases. 293
Thus, the inclusion of copyright infringement among the
predicate acts for civil RICO liability makes for poor public policy.
Although it increases the monetary recovery available to plaintiffs in
civil infringement suits, the Copyright Act already provides more than
adequate remedies to compensate the victims of infringement. The
addition of possible RICO damages disrupts the delicate balance
between plaintiffs and defendants in copyright cases, over-deterring
those who would serve the public interest by testing the boundaries of
the copyright monopoly while providing inadequate deterrence to the
targets of the legislation, namely large-scale, commercial pirates.
liability); id. (Statement of Joseph A. Dubin, Universal Pictures Co., Inc.) (reporting results of
survey proposing that willful infringement be a felony rather than a misdemeanor, showing that
half of the respondents opposed making infringement a felony because they did not believe juries
would return guilty verdicts where the penalty was so stringent).'
291. See Raymond, supra note 271, at 1397-98; Jensen, supra note 1, at 539-44.
292. See Bucy, supra note 156, at 66 (noting that one way in which private justice actions
like civil RICO may hamper regulatory efforts is "by generating harmful precedent that applies
to public regulators").
293. Cf. supra note 114 (discussing legislative history of NET Act, in which it was
expressed that Congress wanted to leave "willfulness" undefined in order to expand discretion of
prosecutors).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Many commentators have been critical of the ever-broadening
expansion of the copyright monopoly over the past three decades;
others have presented specific proposals to remedy the problems
created by the ease of digital copying in the Internet era.2 9 4 But even
if one accepts the entertainment and software industries' arguments
that the harsher penalties for civil and criminal infringement already
incorporated into copyright law are necessary to deter infringement in
the Internet age, the addition of civil RICO penalties to existing
copyright damages is a step too far.
Some caution is needed to avoid treading too heavily on the
public domain and the public interest in access to creative works.
Because prosecutors exercise discretion in pursuing criminal
infringement cases, the government has limited the application of
criminal RICO provisions to the most severe, profit-seeking conduct.
Plaintiffs in civil RICO actions cannot be relied upon to exercise
similar discretion, 29 5 so as courts begin to interpret the application of
civil RICO in copyright cases, they should read the criminal copyright
statute narrowly. Only those defendants who have demonstrated a
specific intent to infringe a copyright should be found to have acted
"willfully." Additionally, the "commercial advantage or private
financial gain" provision should not apply where consumers make
copies for personal use and no evidence exists of any express
"bartering" of copies.
Moreover, in light of Congress' longstanding hesitancy in
applying penalties from other legal doctrines to copyright violations,
courts should interpret the provisions of RICO narrowly in the
copyright context. The "pattern" requirement should require more
than what is necessary to satisfy the "for profit" element of §
506(a)(1)(B), which requires the reproduction or distribution during a
294. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.
J. 1, 43-48 (2006) (discussing the numerous ways that major copyright industries currently seek
to enforce their monopoly and arguing that this "crisis management" mode of enforcement
carries too great a cost and that there are better options for achieving an "acceptable balance
between protection of intellectual content and preservation of personal liberties"); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003); William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907 (1997) (arguing that copyright law and policy is
shaped by powerful corporations who seek to extend their monopoly while depriving authors of
any significant share in their profits, and in creating this system Congress has exceeded its
constitutional authority).
295. "Broad regulations, directions and other forms of guidance are promulgated with the
expectation that prosecutorial discretion will be exercised. Yet plaintiffs in private justice actions
... have every incentive to push theories of liability as far as possible." Bucy, supra note 156, at
64.
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180-day period of copies of one or more copyrighted works with a retail
value in excess of $1,000.296 Otherwise, the pattern requirement
would add no element of proof beyond that required for the underlying
offense when the $1,000 threshold is met by infringement of more
than one work, which will be true in most cases relying on §
506(a)(1)(B) as proof of the "for profit" element of criminal
infringement. Similarly, the "enterprise" requirement should be
narrowly interpreted in copyright cases. If too broadly applied in the
context of P2P file sharing, the mere participation in a P2P network
might constitute participation in an enterprise.
Ultimately, Congress should act to eliminate, or at least limit,
the availability of civil RICO penalties in copyright cases. The
addition of criminal copyright infringement as a predicate RICO act
resulted from the absence of any considered analysis of the potentially
broad impact of the proposed legislation and was unnecessary to
accomplish Congress' objectives in preventing counterfeiting. The
other crimes added as predicate acts by the Anti-Counterfeiting
Consumer Protection Act provide more than enough protection against
organized trafficking in counterfeit goods and services. 297 In fact, the
commercial traffickers that Congress intended to target will often
commit the other crimes at the same time as copyright infringement
by creating counterfeit packaging for films or records or by
representing the copies as legitimate products. Congress thus should
amend the statute to omit criminal copyright infringement from the
list of predicate acts in § 1961(1).
If Congress perceives a need for RICO remedies in extreme
copyright infringement cases, then RICO liability should be tailored to
avoid sweeping in even misdemeanor copyright infringement and
copying for private use. Thus, if criminal copyright infringement is to
remain a RICO predicate act, § 1961(1)(B) should, at the very least, be
amended to apply only to felony copyright infringements that involve
copying for commercial purposes, with "commercial purposes"
expressly excluding the exchange or bartering of copyrighted works for
private use. Doing so would at least eliminate RICO liability for
296. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B) (2000).
297. The Act added "section 2318 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for
phonorecords, computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging and copies
of motion pictures or other audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of
a copyright), section 2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound
recordings and music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in
goods or services bearing counterfeit marks)" after "sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property)." Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968).
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conduct that, although punishable as a misdemeanor because of the
value of the works infringed, lacks any commercial motive.
Adopting these limits on RICO liability would not imply that
copyright infringement for personal use is permissible or warrants
immunity from either criminal prosecution or civil actions. Digital
copying over P2P networks has led to significant lost profits to
copyright owners in the entertainment industry, diminishing the
value of these copyrighted works. The above recommendations would
still permit both criminal and civil enforcement against those who
repeatedly copy or distribute copyrighted works without
authorization, but those who infringe copyrighted works purely for
their own private enjoyment should not face RICO liability, with the
possibility of treble damages in civil lawsuits. In their educational
campaigns to discourage infringement of music recordings and films,
the RIAA and MPAA compared unauthorized copying to shoplifting,
which is an apt analogy. 2 9 8 Today's digital shoplifters should not be
branded as "racketeers," because doing so threatens the delicate
balance between the limited copyright monopoly and the public
domain and is unnecessary given the formidable remedies already
available to copyright owners under the Copyright Act itself.
298. See Recording Industry to Begin Collecting Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits
Against File [Sharers], RIAA NEWs RooM (June 25, 2003), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.
php?id=2B9DA905-4AOD-8439-7EE1-EC9953A22DB9 (including quotations from numerous
participants in the music industry, with many of them equating P2P file sharing with
shoplifting).
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